Was ist jetzt noch links?
In dieser Woche erleben wir einen Kampf um die demokratische Leitkultur. Es geht nicht um die Griechen. Es geht um uns alle! VON SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK
Die griechische Flagge vor einer Statue des Philosophen Sokrates in Athen
Die griechische Flagge vor einer Statue des Philosophen Sokrates in Athen | © Reuters/Yannis Behrakis
Ein bekannter Witz aus dem letzten Jahrzehnt der Sowjetunion handelt von Rabinowitsch, einem Juden, der auswandern will. Der Bürokrat im Auswanderungsamt fragt ihn nach dem Grund, und Rabinowitsch antwortet: “Es gibt zwei Gründe. Der erste ist, dass ich mich vor einem Machtverlust der Kommunisten in der Sowjetunion fürchte. Die neuen Machthaber könnten dann die kommunistischen Verbrechen allein uns, den Juden, in die Schuhe schieben – und es könnte wieder judenfeindliche Pogrome geben …” – “Aber”, unterbricht ihn der Bürokrat, “das ist totaler Unsinn, nichts kann sich in der Sowjetunion je ändern, die kommunistische Macht wird ewig währen!” “Tja”, entgegnet Rabinowitsch ruhig, “das ist mein zweiter Grund.”

In Athen kursiert derzeit eine neue Version dieses Witzes. Ein junger Grieche sucht das australische Konsulat in Athen auf und fragt nach einem Arbeitsvisum. “Warum wollen Sie Griechenland verlassen?”, fragt der Beamte. “Aus zwei Gründen”, antwortet der Grieche. “Erstens befürchte ich, dass Griechenland die EU verlassen wird, was zu noch mehr Armut und Chaos im Land führen wird …” – “Aber”, unterbricht ihn der Beamte, “das ist totaler Unsinn, Griechenland wird in der EU bleiben und sich der Finanzdisziplin unterwerfen!” – “Tja”, entgegnet der Grieche ruhig, “das ist mein zweiter Grund.”

Sind also beide Entscheidungen die schlechteren, um Stalin zu paraphrasieren? Der Moment ist gekommen, an dem wir die irrelevanten Debatten über mögliche Fehler und Fehlurteile der griechischen Regierung hinter uns lassen müssen. Inzwischen steht viel zu viel auf dem Spiel.

Die Tatsache, dass sich in den Verhandlungen zwischen Griechenland und den EU-Verwaltern eine Kompromissformel immer im allerletzten Moment verflüchtigt hat, ist an sich schon höchst bezeichnend. Es geht nicht mehr wirklich um finanzielle Meinungsverschiedenheiten – auf dieser Ebene unterscheiden sich die Positionen nur noch minimal. Die EU beschuldigt Griechenland in der Regel, lediglich Allgemeinplätze zu verbreiten und vage Versprechen ohne belastbare Details zu machen, während Griechenland der EU vorwirft, dass diese selbst kleinste Details zu kontrollieren versuche und dem Land Bedingungen auferlege, die noch rigoroser seien als die, die sie der Vorgängerregierung aufgebürdet habe.

Hinter diesen Vorhaltungen steckt jedoch ein ganz anderer, viel tieferer Konflikt. Der griechische Premier Alexis Tsipras bemerkte unlängst, wenn er sich allein mit Angela Merkel zum Abendessen träfe, hätten beide binnen zwei Stunden eine Lösung gefunden. Er wollte damit sagen, dass Merkel und er, zwei Politiker, den Streit als einen politischen behandeln würden, im Unterschied zu technokratischen Verwaltern wie dem Kopf der Euro-Gruppe, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Wenn es in dieser ganzen Geschichte einen Bösewicht gibt, dann ist es Dijsselbloem mit seinem Motto: “Wenn ich die Dinge erst einmal von ihrer ideologischen Seite nehme, erreiche ich nichts mehr.”

Auch die EU-Technokraten folgen einer Ideologie – nur einer anderen

Damit kommen wir zur Krux des Ganzen: Tsipras und Varoufakis reden, als seien sie Teil eines offenen politischen Prozesses, in dem letztlich “ideologische” (auf normativen Präferenzen beruhende) Entscheidungen getroffen werden müssten. Die EU-Technokraten reden, als ob es sich bei alldem um eine Frage detaillierter regulatorischer Maßnahmen handelte, und wenn die Griechen diese Haltung ablehnen und grundsätzlichere politische Fragen aufwerfen, wirft man ihnen vor, sie würden lügen und sich vor konkreten Lösungen drücken. Die Wahrheit ist hier eindeutig auf der griechischen Seite: Dijsselbloems Verleugnung der “ideologischen Seite” ist Ideologie in Reinkultur, sie gibt Entscheidungen, die effektiv politisch-ideologisch begründet sind, fälschlich als Regulierungsmaßnahmen aus.

Dieser Artikel stammt aus der ZEIT Nr. 27 vom 02.07.2015.
Dieser Artikel stammt aus der ZEIT Nr. 27 vom 02.07.2015. | Die aktuelle ZEIT können Sie am Kiosk oder hier erwerben.
Aufgrund dieser Asymmetrie wirkt der “Dialog” zwischen Tsipras oder Varoufakis und ihren EU-Partnern oft wie das Gespräch zwischen einem jungen Studenten, der ernsthaft über Grundsatzfragen diskutieren möchte, und einem arroganten Professor, der diese Themen in seinen Antworten beschämenderweise ignoriert und den Studenten wegen technischer Mängel ausschilt: “Das ist nicht korrekt formuliert! Diese Regel haben Sie nicht berücksichtigt!” Oder gar wie der Wortwechsel zwischen einer vergewaltigten Frau, die verzweifelt berichten will, was ihr widerfahren ist, und einem Polizisten, der sie ständig mit Fragen nach bürokratischen Details unterbricht. Diese Umstellung von der eigentlichen Politik auf eine neutrale Expertenverwaltung zeichnet unseren gesamten politischen Prozess aus: Strategische, machtbasierte Entscheidungen werden zunehmend als administrative Regulierungen ausgegeben, die auf neutralem Expertenwissen beruhen sollen. Und sie werden immer öfter hinter verschlossenen Türen ausgehandelt und ohne demokratische Beteiligung durchgesetzt.

Was ist jetzt noch links?
Seite 3/3: Syriza will etwas Richtiges
Varoufakis wundert sich selbst über das Mysterium, dass Banken Geld nach Griechenland pumpten und mit einem klientelistischen Staat zusammenarbeiteten, obwohl sie genau wussten, wie es um diesen stand – ohne die stillschweigende Billigung des westlichen Establishments hätte sich Griechenland niemals so hoch verschulden können. Der Syriza-Regierung ist vollkommen bewusst, dass die Hauptbedrohung nicht aus Brüssel kommt – sie lauert in Griechenland selbst, dem Inbegriff eines klientelistischen, korrupten Staates.

Syriza will etwas Richtiges, das im bestehenden System nicht möglich ist

Europa (die EU-Bürokratie) muss sich den Vorwurf gefallen lassen, Griechenland für seine Korruption und Ineffizienz kritisiert und gleichzeitig mit der Nea Dimokratia just die politische Kraft unterstützt zu haben, die diese Korruption und Ineffizienz verkörperte. Der Syriza-Regierung geht es genau darum, diese systematische Blockade zu überwinden – man lese nur Varoufakis’ programmatische Erklärung im britischen Guardian, in der er das letztliche strategische Ziel seiner Partei beschreibt: “Ein griechischer oder ein portugiesischer oder ein italienischer Austritt aus der Euro-Zone würde bald zu einem Zerbrechen des europäischen Kapitalismus führen. Die Folge wäre eine ernsthaft rezessionsgefährdete Überschussregion östlich des Rheins und nördlich der Alpen, während das restliche Europa in einer brutalen Stagflation versänke. Wer würde wohl von dieser Entwicklung profitieren? Eine progressive Linke, die sich in den öffentlichen Institutionen Europas wie ein Phönix aus der Asche erhebt? Oder die Nazis der Goldenen Morgenröte, die diversen neofaschistischen Bewegungen, Fremdenfeinde und Ganoven? Ich habe nicht den geringsten Zweifel daran, wer von beiden am meisten von einem Zerfall der Euro-Zone profitieren würde. Ich für meinen Teil bin nicht bereit, frischen Wind in die Segel dieser postmodernen Version der 1930er Jahre zu bringen. Wenn das bedeutet, dass wir es sind, die angemessen unberechenbaren Marxisten, die versuchen müssen, den europäischen Kapitalismus vor sich selbst zu retten, dann sei’s drum. Nicht aus Liebe zum europäischen Kapitalismus, zur Euro-Zone, zu Brüssel oder zur Europäischen Zentralbank, sondern allein deshalb, weil wir die unnötigen menschlichen Kosten dieser Krise minimieren wollen.”

SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK
ist Philosoph und lehrt in London.
Die Finanzpolitik der Syriza-Regierung hat sich eng an die folgenden Grundsätze gehalten: Defizitvermeidung, strenge Finanzdisziplin, höhere Steuereinnahmen. Dennoch charakterisierten einige deutsche Medien Varoufakis jüngst als einen Psychotiker, der in seinem eigenen Sonderuniversum lebt – aber ist er wirklich so radikal? Was an Varoufakis so enerviert, ist nicht seine Radikalität, sondern seine vernünftige pragmatische Bescheidenheit. Bei näherer Betrachtung seiner Vorschläge muss einem unweigerlich auffallen, dass sie in Maßnahmen bestehen, die vor vierzig Jahren Teil des sozialdemokratischen Standardprogramms gewesen wären; die schwedischen Regierungen der 1960er Jahre etwa verfolgten weitaus radikalere Ziele. Es ist ein trauriges Zeichen unserer Zeit, dass man heutzutage der radikalen Linken angehören muss, um dieselben Mittel zu befürworten – ein Zeichen finsterer Zeiten, aber auch eine Chance für die Linke, den Raum zu besetzen, der vor einigen Jahrzehnten noch der der moderaten linken Mitte war.

Vielleicht aber geht dieses endlos wiederholte Argument, wie gemäßigt Syrizas Politik in Wirklichkeit sei, nämlich so wie die der guten alten Sozialdemokratie, am Ziel vorbei. Syriza ist faktisch gefährlich, die Partei stellt sehr wohl eine Bedrohung für die gegenwärtige Ausrichtung der EU dar – der globale Kapitalismus kann sich eine Rückkehr zum alten Wohlfahrtsstaat nicht leisten. Die Beschwichtigung über die Bescheidenheit von Syrizas Zielen ist also auch ein bisschen scheinheilig: Ihre Anhänger wollen effektiv etwas, das innerhalb der Koordinaten des bestehenden globalen Systems nicht möglich ist.

Hier gilt es, eine ernsthafte strategische Wahl zu treffen: Was, wenn der Moment gekommen ist, die Maske der Bescheidenheit fallen zu lassen und für einen wesentlich radikaleren Wandel einzutreten, einen Wandel, der nötig ist, um auch nur bescheidene Erfolge zu erzielen? Vielleicht ist das angekündigte Referendum der erste Schritt in diese Richtung.

Europe Wins

Tsipras and Syriza have won big in the referendum, strengthening their hand for whatever comes next. But they’re not the only winners: I would argue that Europe, and the European idea, just won big — at least in the sense of dodging a bullet.

I know that’s not how most people see it. But think of it this way: we have just witnessed Greece stand up to a truly vile campaign of bullying and intimidation, an attempt to scare the Greek public, not just into accepting creditor demands, but into getting rid of their government. It was a shameful moment in modern European history, and would have set a truly ugly precedent if it had succeeded.

But it didn’t. You don’t have to love Syriza, or believe that they know what they’re doing — it’s not clear that they do, although the troika has been even worse — to believe that European institutions have just been saved from their own worst instincts. If Greece had been forced into line by financial fear mongering, Europe would have sinned in a way that would sully its reputation for generations. Instead, it’s something we can, perhaps, eventually regard as an aberration.

And if Greece ends up exiting the euro? There’s actually a pretty good case for Grexit now — and in any case, democracy matters more than any currency arrangement.

Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin

John J. Mearsheimer

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out o! a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest o! Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster o! Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part o! Ukraine. But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most o! the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot o! the trouble is “#$% enlargement, the central element o! a larger strategy to move Ukraine out o& Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the ‘(’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing o! the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements, too. Since the mid- 1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed “#$% enlargement and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow o! Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a “coup”—was the )nal straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a “#$% naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its e*orts to join the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core John J. Mearsheimer 2 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a 0awed view o! international politics. They tend to believe that the logic o! realism holds little relevance in the twenty-)rst century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis o! such liberal principles as the rule o1 law, economic interdependence, and democracy. But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant—and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy. THE WESTERN AFFRONT As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and “#$% stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reuni)ed Germany paci)ed. But they and their Russian successors did not want “#$% to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for “#$% to expand. The )rst round o! enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. During “#$%’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the )rst sign o! what could happen when “#$% comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. . . . The 0ame o! war could burst out across the whole o& Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail “#$%’s eastward movement—which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none o! the new members shared a border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries. Then “#$% began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, “#$%’s members reached a compromise: the Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 3 alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations o! Georgia and Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members o! “#$%.” Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much o! a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to “#$% would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that i! Ukraine was accepted into “#$%, it would cease to exist.” Russia’s invasion o! Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining “#$%. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into “#$%, had decided in the summer o! 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided—and out o! “#$%. After )ghting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control o! Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, “#$% never publicly abandoned its goal o1 bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And “#$% expansion continued marching forward, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009. The ‘(, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the ‘( economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from o2ce, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the ‘( o! trying to create a “sphere o! in0uence” in eastern Europe. In the eyes o& Russian leaders, ‘( expansion is a stalking horse for “#$% expansion. The West’s )nal tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. John J. Mearsheimer 4 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ its e*orts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro- Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary o! state for European and Eurasian a*airs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part o! that e*ort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonpro)t foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the “‘3’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the “‘3 decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its e*orts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions. When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise o! the ideology o& Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may )nd himsel! on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.”

CREATING A CRISIS

The West’s triple package o! policies—”#$% enlargement, ‘( expansion, and democracy promotion—added fuel to a )re waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the ‘( and decided to accept a $15 billion Russian countero*er instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths o! some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly 0ew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych 0ed to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists. Although the full extent o! U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and RepubWhy the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 5 lican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and Geo*rey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the history books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians o! all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster. For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had arrived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands o! Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port o! Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Russians compose roughly 60 percent o! its population. Most o! them wanted out o! Ukraine. Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the Ukrainian border, threatening to invade i! the government cracks down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price o! the natural gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports. Putin is playing hardball. THE DIAGNOSIS Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse o& 0at land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a bu*er state o! enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West. Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are John J. Mearsheimer 6 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington i! China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider “#$% expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any e*ort to turn those countries against Russia—a message that the 2008 Russian- Georgian war also made crystal clear. O2cials from the United States and its European allies contend that they tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should understand that “#$% has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alliance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new member states. In 2002, it even created a body called the “#$%-Russia Council in an e*ort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none o! these measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to “#$% enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them. To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began advocating “#$% expansion. Pundits advanced a variety o! arguments for and against enlargement, but there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted “#$% to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. But most realists opposed expansion, in the belie! that a declining Imagine the outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 7 great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the )rst round o! “#$% expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will a*ect their policies,” he said. “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.” Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members o! the Clinton administration. They believed that the end o! the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary o! State Madeleine Albright put it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire continent look like western Europe. And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democracy in the countries o! eastern Europe, increase economic interdependence among them, and embed them in international institutions. Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little di2- culty convincing their European allies to support “#$% enlargement. After all, given the ‘(’s past achievements, Europeans were even more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer mattered and that an all-inclusive liberal order could maintain peace in Europe. So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about European security during the )rst decade o! this century that even as the alliance adopted an open-door policy o! growth, “#$% expansion faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted dogma among U.S. o2cials. In March, for example, President Barack Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeatedly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view o! power.” Secretary o! State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea crisis re0ected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty- )rst century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped-up pretext.” John J. Mearsheimer 8 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ In essence, the two sides have been operating with di*erent playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. BLAME GAME In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that “#$% expansion would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents o! expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As i! on cue, most Western o2cials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a )rst-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy. Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise o! the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the waters to see i! the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adol& Hitler, and striking any kind o! deal with him would repeat the mistake o& Munich. Thus, “#$% must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe. This argument falls apart on close inspection. I& Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia, signs o1 his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who supported “#$% expansion were not doing so out o! a fear that Russia was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 9 Besides, even i! it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country. Roughly 15 million people—one-third o! Ukraine’s population—live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. An overwhelming majority o! those people want to remain part o! Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation. Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs o! turning into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance o! pacifying all o! Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly occupation; its weak economy would su*er even more in the face o! the resulting sanctions. But even i& Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to successfully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response to events there has been defensive, not o*ensive.

A WAY OUT

Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behavior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsurprising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggression. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the table,” neither the United States nor its “#$% allies are prepared to use force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the ‘( put in place their third round o1 limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level individuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-pro- )le banks, energy companies, and defense )rms. They also threatened to unleash another, tougher round o! sanctions, aimed at whole sectors o! the Russian economy. Such measures will have little e*ect. Harsh sanctions are likely o* the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany, have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and cause serious economic damage within the ‘(. But even i! the United John J. Mearsheimer 10 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts o! punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule. Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the )rst place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director o! the 4-#, did not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian government. The ‘(, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, president o! the European Commission, summarized ‘( thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty o! solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the ‘( and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fatefully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting o! “#$% members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over “#$% enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “#$%’s secretary- general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse. There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however—although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral bu*er between “#$% and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-“#$%. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 11 camp. To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out “#$%’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the ‘(, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States—a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western 0ank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering e*orts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights o! its Russian speakers. Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs o! continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals e*ectively with the problem at hand. That option is clearly open to the United States. One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts o1 life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor. Even i! one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the ‘( and “#$%, the fact remains that the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral bu!er. John J. Mearsheimer 12 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ Ukraine i! it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, especially i! its defense is not a vital interest for them. Indulging the dreams o! some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people. O! course, some analysts might concede that “#$% handled relations with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia constitutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time—and that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present policy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even i& Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into “#$%. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height o& folly to create a new “#$% member that the other members have no intention o! defending. N#$% has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine “#$% membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course. Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three o! these issues in the past; in the summer o! 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out o! the )re by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process—a scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.!

[Joseph E. Stiglitz]

European Union’s last act?

Nekoč, na primer, so se bili spoprijeli zaradi vprašanja, kako da je izreči krvavo geslo: »Vse zbil!« Nekateri v kotu so kratkomalo zahtevali, da je treba govoriti, kakor je napi­sano: »Vse zbilj!« Drugi so ugovarjali; treba da je reči: »Vse zbou!« Nekdo se je celo oglasil s svojo posebno mo­drostjo: »Vse zbiv!« To imenitno vprašanje še nikakor ni bilo razrešeno, ko so načeli že drugo: če bi, na primer, pisali fonetično, ali naj bi tedaj pisali »vse zbou«, ali »vse zbov«; oziroma »vse zbiv«, ali »vse zbiu«. Toliko, da ni prišlo do hudega tepeža; vprašanje samo pa je obtičalo tam, kjer tiči dandanašnji.

V drugem kotu so ob taistem času onegavili mnogo višji problem. Če je namreč gledališka umetnost nujno potrebna za blagor človeštva; in če je, čemu da je. Na koncu je ostalo sredi staje tisto, kar ostane ob rešetanju vsakega kulturnega vprašanja: smrdeč kupček hinavščine. In iz kupčka, tega smrdečega, zraste nov problem: kdo da ga je bil naredil.

Spisal Ivan Cankar.

Izbral in priobčil Igor Koršič.

Tu spodaj sta začetek in konec te diagnoze debat v dolini. Žal ne samo kulturniških.

Objavljena je bila  pod naslovom Tišina.

Družba je bila, od vseh strani z visoko mejo zastražena, sama vase in v svojo malost zamaknjena; otroci v otroškem vrtcu, piščanci v kurniku. Sonce je sijalo tako prečudežno, da je dala bolha velikansko senco; in kobilica je bila masto­dont. Kdor jih gleda sedaj, resne, starikave, čeljustave, ime­nitno stopicajoče, kričave in jokave pritlikavce, se mu zdi, da bere povesti Gulliverjeve.

Klepetanje klep na klep. Kolikor tesna je staja, vendar je kotov in kotičkov brez števila; in vsak kot je zase globus. Človek bi rekel, da gleda spako sveta, gleda utelešen para­dokson: vesoljnost v orehovi lupini, kajti vse do fermenta je bilo tam po kotih, ničesar ni manjkalo: ozka in široka po­litika, domače novice, razne stvari, drobiž in zgodbe za kratek čas, na grobo izmišljeni telegrami, civilizacija od fraka do irhastih hlač, diletantizem in umetnost, obadva v vseh svojih pisanih oblikah, človeško znanje od analfabetskih poljan do jezuitskih višav, zamišljena bogovernost, godrnjav skepticizem in vnebovpijoče framasonstvo, modrost od Pla­tona do Brenceljna, čednosti vse, kolikor si jih je Bog bil izmislil v svoji neskončni dobrotljivosti, bratstvo brez kraja, popustljivost do samoponižanja, blagodarnost do beračenja, zvestoba do histerije, zaupljivost do naivnosti in čisto zraven nezaupljivost do paranoje, hudobnost vsa, kakor jo je bil v bolečini porodil ter nato v svoji grenki prešernosti legijon­krat razcepil satirik Satan Sam, zakrknjena samopašnost, smehljajoča hinavščina, krivogleda zavidnost, hropeče ži­valstvo, tankoglasa pohotnost, sramežljivo izdajalstvo in na prste študirana mladinska poezija. Vse do fermenta.

(Tu se je nahajal izbrani odlomek.)

Perspektiva je bila v tej družbi ob vso pravico in veljavo. Blizu ali daleč, veliko ali malo, važno ali nevažno, teh pojmov ni bilo. Ali pa vsaj merila ni bilo nikakšnega. Po­topila se je ladja, z njo tisoč in več ljudi; to je bila važna stvar. Zgodi se časih, da ugleda človek nenadoma svojo senco na zidu, spačeno, silno in strahotno; preplašen zaokrene korak in senca se mu ponižna in majhna smehlja ob stopalu. Zgodi se časih; v staji se je godilo zmerom. Dogodek, ki bi ga navaden človek, takorekoč, ne ošinil s kotom očesa, je planil v družbo strašen kakor volk med ovce, da se je beke­taje strnila in razbegnila. Beketali so, dokler se niso utrujeni spogledali ter molče ustanovili, da niso pribeketali ni zrna soli. Navsezgodaj so kričali vsako jutro po senzaciji, kakor

lačen otrok po mleku; in senzacija je prišla, ker je morala priti, visoka, črna in koščena, kakor Kamila med Slovence.

Kar je bilo v tej družbi zares in vselej važno, je bila važnost sama, važnost kot taka. Karkoli je obsenčila, se je ogromno zavalilo pred oči in na duše, da je sapa ledenela pred odprtimi šobami. Tako se da razložiti čudna prikazen, da se je iznenada v brezdanjo noč zvrnila stvar, še predno je bila dodobrega obmeketana in da se je na njeno mesto kar nasilno, samovoljno in pljuskoma postavila druga. Če je imela važnost ob takšnih svojih kapricah kakšne posebne sazloge in naklepe, ne vem; meni in vam ostanejo skriti na vekomej.

Primerilo se je mnogokdaj pod večer, da je klepetanje utihnilo. Pod žaltavo odejo vsakdanjosti se je vzdramil čist spomin na čase, ki so bili, se je zgenila slutnja časov, ki bodo. Oglasila se je pesem, mehka in mila in žalostna, pa vsa polna zaupanja in vere. Globoko in strašno je bilo močvirje, da je tolika lepota vzklila iz njega.

»Je pa davi slanca pala . . .«

Mirnejša_so lica, dihnil je bil nanje sijaj božje dobrotlji­vosti. Ena sama pesem, drobna kakor ščinkovec, je lahkotno premagala ogromnost nizkote, črno pezo bolečine, dušečo tesnobo staje, vzdignila se vriskaje k nebesom. Iz mrtvih oči je pogledala duša, izkazala je, da je.-

Alarm!

Klepetanje, prerekanje, gramatika; filozofija, umetnost, Kamila, zaupljivost, ljubezen, nizkotnost, pesem, življenje, duša, ničesar več. Tišina tolika, da ni čuti utripanja src. Edino, kar je še ostalo, je občutek brezmejnega ponižanja, nezaslišane smešnosti, grenki, neznosni občutek lastne ma­losti in nemoči.

Zdajle si najbrž kdo misli, da sem nameraval načeti zgodovino »celice št. 4.«. Napisal pa sem le nahitro, kako je živel slovenski narod vse do avgusta meseca leta 1914.

Weimar on the Aegean
Try to talk about the policies we need in a depressed world economy, and someone is sure to counter with the specter of Weimar Germany, supposedly an object lesson in the dangers of budget deficits and monetary expansion. But the history of Germany after World War I is almost always cited in a curiously selective way. We hear endlessly about the hyperinflation of 1923, when people carted around wheelbarrows full of cash, but we never hear about the much more relevant deflation of the early 1930s, as the government of Chancellor Brüning — having learned the wrong lessons — tried to defend Germany’s peg to gold with tight money and harsh austerity.

And what about what happened before the hyperinflation, when the victorious Allies tried to force Germany to pay huge reparations? That’s also a tale with a lot of modern relevance, because it has a direct bearing on the crisis now brewing over Greece.

The point is that now, more than ever, it is crucial that Europe’s leaders remember the right history. If they don’t, the European project of peace and democracy through prosperity will not survive.

About those reparations: The basic story here is that Britain and France, instead of viewing the newly established German democracy as a potential partner, treated it as a conquered enemy, demanding that it make up their own wartime losses. This was deeply unwise — and the demands placed on Germany were impossible to meet, for two reasons. First, Germany’s economy had already been devastated by the war. Second, the true burden on that shrunken economy would — as John Maynard Keynes explained in his angry, powerful book “The Economic Consequences of the Peace” — be far greater than the direct payments to the vengeful Allies.

In the end, and inevitably, the actual sums collected from Germany fell far short of Allied demands. But the attempt to levy tribute on a ruined nation — incredibly, France actually invaded and occupied the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial heartland, in an effort to extract payment — crippled German democracy and poisoned relations with its neighbors.

Which brings us to the confrontation between Greece and its creditors.

You can argue that Greece brought its problems on itself, although it had a lot of help from irresponsible lenders. At this point, however, the simple fact is that Greece cannot pay its debts in full. Austerity has devastated its economy as thoroughly as military defeat devastated Germany — real Greek G.D.P. per capita fell 26 percent from 2007 to 2013, compared with a German decline of 29 percent from 1913 to 1919.

Despite this catastrophe, Greece is making payments to its creditors, running a primary surplus — an excess of revenue over spending other than interest — of around 1.5 percent of G.D.P. And the new Greek government is willing to keep running that surplus. What it is not willing to do is meet creditor demands that it triple the surplus, and keep running huge surpluses for many years to come.

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What would happen if Greece were to try to generate those huge surpluses? It would have to further slash government spending — but that wouldn’t be the end of the story. Spending cuts have already driven Greece into a deep depression, and further cuts would make that depression deeper. Falling incomes would, however, mean falling tax receipts, so that the deficit would decline by much less than the initial reduction in spending — probably less than half as much. To meet its target, then, Greece would have to do another round of cuts, and then another.

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RECENT COMMENTS

Athanassios Tolis 33 minutes ago
Falling incomes would NOT mean falling tax receipts for the simple reason that at the present time all income comes straight from government…
Jon Champs 46 minutes ago
It is incorrect to paint Britain as the one treating Germany as conquered after WW1 – it tried hard to stop Clemenceau taking the path of…
James 1 hour ago
GDP of Greece is less than the state of Indiana, Greece has been a resource poor nation since the Bronze Age but intellectually and…
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Furthermore, a shrinking economy would lead to falling private spending too — another, indirect cost of the austerity.

Put it all together, and attempting to cough up the extra 3 percent of G.D.P. the creditors are demanding would cost Greece not 3 percent, but something like 8 percent of G.D.P. And remember, this would come on top of one of the worst economic slumps in history.

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What would happen if Greece were simply to refuse to pay? Well, 21st-century European nations don’t use their armies as bill collectors. But there are other forms of coercion. We now know that in 2010 the European Central Bank threatened, in effect, to collapse the Irish banking system unless Dublin agreed to an International Monetary Fund program.

The threat of something similar hangs implicitly over Greece, although my hope is that the central bank, which is under different and more open-minded management these days, wouldn’t go along.

In any case, European creditors should realize that flexibility — giving Greece a chance to recover — is in their own interests. They may not like the new leftist government, but it’s a duly elected government whose leaders are, from everything I’ve heard, sincerely committed to democratic ideals. Europe could do a lot worse — and if the creditors are vengeful, it will.

Yanis Varoufakis: No Time for Games in Europe

ATHENS — I am writing this piece on the margins of a crucial negotiation with my country’s creditors — a negotiation the result of which may mark a generation, and even prove a turning point for Europe’s unfolding experiment with monetary union.

Game theorists analyze negotiations as if they were split-a-pie games involving selfish players. Because I spent many years during my previous life as an academic researching game theory, some commentators rushed to presume that as Greece’s new finance minister I was busily devising bluffs, stratagems and outside options, struggling to improve upon a weak hand.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

If anything, my game-theory background convinced me that it would be pure folly to think of the current deliberations between Greece and our partners as a bargaining game to be won or lost via bluffs and tactical subterfuge.

The trouble with game theory, as I used to tell my students, is that it takes for granted the players’ motives. In poker or blackjack this assumption is unproblematic. But in the current deliberations between our European partners and Greece’s new government, the whole point is to forge new motives. To fashion a fresh mind-set that transcends national divides, dissolves the creditor-debtor distinction in favor of a pan-European perspective, and places the common European good above petty politics, dogma that proves toxic if universalized, and an us-versus-them mind-set.

As finance minister of a small, fiscally stressed nation lacking its own central bank and seen by many of our partners as a problem debtor, I am convinced that we have one option only: to shun any temptation to treat this pivotal moment as an experiment in strategizing and, instead, to present honestly the facts concerning Greece’s social economy, table our proposals for regrowing Greece, explain why these are in Europe’s interest, and reveal the red lines beyond which logic and duty prevent us from going.

The great difference between this government and previous Greek governments is twofold: We are determined to clash with mighty vested interests in order to reboot Greece and gain our partners’ trust. We are also determined not to be treated as a debt colony that should suffer what it must. The principle of the greatest austerity for the most depressed economy would be quaint if it did not cause so much unnecessary suffering.

I am often asked: What if the only way you can secure funding is to cross your red lines and accept measures that you consider to be part of the problem, rather than of its solution? Faithful to the principle that I have no right to bluff, my answer is: The lines that we have presented as red will not be crossed. Otherwise, they would not be truly red, but merely a bluff.

But what if this brings your people much pain? I am asked. Surely you must be bluffing.

The problem with this line of argument is that it presumes, along with game theory, that we live in a tyranny of consequences. That there are no circumstances when we must do what is right not as a strategy but simply because it is … right.

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Against such cynicism the new Greek government will innovate. We shall desist, whatever the consequences, from deals that are wrong for Greece and wrong for Europe. The “extend and pretend” game that began after Greece’s public debt became unserviceable in 2010 will end. No more loans — not until we have a credible plan for growing the economy in order to repay those loans, help the middle class get back on its feet and address the hideous humanitarian crisis. No more “reform” programs that target poor pensioners and family-owned pharmacies while leaving large-scale corruption untouched.

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Jim Verdonik 21 minutes ago
Greece is just a deadbeat and should be treated accordingly.One difference from when Greece first got it’s bailout is that no one cares now…
maTTinATLanta 22 minutes ago
Exactly.For the time being, it amounts to German (European) pensioners paying their Greek compatriots. But that ship has sailed!Especially…
Thekla De Rango 22 minutes ago
Mr Varoufakis, you have set the benchmark high! A Finance Minister who is not only eloquent, but knowledgeable of economics, compassionate…
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Our government is not asking our partners for a way out of repaying our debts. We are asking for a few months of financial stability that will allow us to embark upon the task of reforms that the broad Greek population can own and support, so we can bring back growth and end our inability to pay our dues.

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One may think that this retreat from game theory is motivated by some radical-left agenda. Not so. The major influence here is Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who taught us that the rational and the free escape the empire of expediency by doing what is right.

How do we know that our modest policy agenda, which constitutes our red line, is right in Kant’s terms? We know by looking into the eyes of the hungry in the streets of our cities or contemplating our stressed middle class, or considering the interests of hard-working people in every European village and city within our monetary union. After all, Europe will only regain its soul when it regains the people’s trust by putting their interests center-stage.

Yanis Varoufakis is the finance minister of Greece

The Greek Stand-By Arrangement

For tomorrow’s column I went back to the original, May 2010 stand-by arrangement for Greece, to see what the troika was demanding and predicting at the beginning of the austerity push, and how it compares with what actually happened.

First of all, I quite often encounter people who claim that Greece never really did austerity. I guess this is based on national stereotypes, or something, because the numbers are actually awesome. Here’s non-interest spending as projected in the original agreement versus actual spending since 2010. Because the troika kept increasing its demands, Greek spending has ended up far lower – austerity has been far more intense – than anything envisaged at the beginning.

So how can Greece still be in debt trouble? The original agreement assumed a brief, fairly shallow recession followed by recovery – nothing like the reality of depression and deflation. Here’s nominal GDP as predicted versus actual outcome. Naturally, the collapse of GDP reduced revenue and raised the debt/GDP ratio.

Oh, and unemployment was supposed to peak a bit under 15 percent, not hit 28.

How did they get it so wrong? In the spring of 2010 both the ECB and the European Commission bought fully into expansionary austerity; slashing spending wasn’t going to hurt the Greek economy, because the confidence fairy would come to the rescue. The IMF never went all the way there, but it used an unrealistically low multiplier, which it arrived at by looking at historical examples of austerity while ignoring the difference in monetary conditions.

The thing is, we now have essentially the same people who so totally misjudged the impacts of austerity lecturing the Greeks on the need to be realistic.

Much too responsible

Paul Krugman

The United States and Europe have a lot in common. Both are multicultural and democratic; both are immensely wealthy; both possess currencies with global reach. Both, unfortunately, experienced giant housing and credit bubbles between 2000 and 2007, and suffered painful slumps when the bubbles burst.

Since then, however, policy on the two sides of the Atlantic has diverged. In one great economy, officials have shown a stern commitment to fiscal and monetary virtue, making strenuous efforts to balance budgets while remaining vigilant against inflation. In the other, not so much.

And the difference in attitudes is the main reason the two economies are now on such different paths. Spendthrift, loose-money America is experiencing a solid recovery — a reality reflected in President Obama’s feisty State of the Union address. Meanwhile, virtuous Europe is sinking ever deeper into deflationary quicksand; everyone hopes that the new monetary measures announced Thursday will break the downward spiral, but nobody I know really expects them to be enough.

On the U.S. economy: No, it’s not morning in America, let alone the kind of prosperity we managed during the Clinton years. Recovery could and should have come much faster, and family incomes remain well below their pre-crisis level. Although you’d never know it from the public discussion, there’s overwhelming agreement among economists that the Obama stimulus of 2009-10 helped limit the damage from the financial crisis, but it was too small and faded away far too fast. Still, when you compare the performance of the American economy over the past two years with all those Republican predictions of doom, you can see why Mr. Obama is strutting a bit.

Europe, on the other hand — or more precisely the eurozone, the 18 countries sharing a common currency — did almost everything wrong. On the fiscal side, Europe never did much stimulus, and quickly turned to austerity — spending cuts and, to a lesser extent, tax increases — despite high unemployment. On the monetary side, officials fought the imaginary menace of inflation, and took years to acknowledge that the real threat is deflation.

Why did they get it so wrong?

To some extent, the turn toward austerity reflected institutional weakness: In the United States, federal programs like Social Security, Medicare and food stamps helped support states like Florida with especially severe housing busts, whereas European nations in similar straits, like Spain, were on their own. But European austerity also reflected willful misdiagnosis of the situation. In Europe as in America, the excesses that led to crisis overwhelmingly involved private rather than public debt, with Greece very much an outlier. But officials in Berlin and Brussels chose to ignore the evidence in favor of a narrative that placed all the blame on budget deficits, and simultaneously rejected the evidence suggesting — correctly — that trying to slash deficits in a depressed economy would deepen the depression.

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Meanwhile, Europe’s central bankers decided to worry about inflation in 2011 and raise interest rates. Even at the time it was obvious that this was foolish — yes, there had been an uptick in headline inflation, but measures of underlying inflation were too low, not too high.

Monetary policy got much better after Mario Draghi became president of the European Central Bank in late 2011. Indeed, Mr. Draghi’s heroic efforts to provide liquidity to nations facing speculative attack almost surely saved the euro from collapse. But it’s not at all clear that he has the tools to fight off the broader deflationary forces set in motion by years of wrongheaded policy. Furthermore, he has to function with one hand tied behind his back, because Germany remains adamantly opposed to anything that might make life easier for debtor nations.
The terrible thing is that Europe’s economy was wrecked in the name of responsibility. True, there have been times when being tough meant reducing deficits and resisting the temptation to print money. In a depressed economy, however, a balanced-budget fetish and a hard-money obsession are deeply irresponsible. Not only do they hurt the economy in the short run, they can — and in Europe, have — inflict long-run harm, damaging the economy’s potential and driving it into a deflationary trap that’s very hard to escape.

Nor was this an innocent mistake. The thing that strikes me about Europe’s archons of austerity, its doyens of deflation, is their self-indulgence. They felt comfortable, emotionally and politically, demanding sacrifice (from other people) at a time when the world needed more spending. They were all too eager to ignore the evidence that they were wrong.

And Europe will be paying the price for their self-indulgence for years, perhaps decades, to come.

Kaj pa Švicarji?

Ah, Switzerland, famed for cuckoo clocks and sound money. Other nations may experiment with radical economic policies, but with the Swiss you don’t get surprises.

Until you do. On Thursday the Swiss National Bank, the equivalent of the Federal Reserve, shocked the financial world with a double whammy, simultaneously abandoning its policy of pegging the Swiss franc to the euro and cutting the interest rate it pays on bank reserves to minus, that’s right, minus 0.75 percent. Market turmoil ensued.

And you should feel a shiver of fear, even if you don’t have any direct financial stake in the value of the franc. For Switzerland’s monetary travails illustrate in miniature just how hard it is to fight the deflationary vortex now dragging down much of the world economy.

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What you need to understand is that all the usual rules of economic policy changed when financial crisis struck in 2008; we entered a looking-glass world, and we still haven’t emerged. In many cases, economic virtues became vices: Willingness to save became a drag on investment, fiscal probity a route to stagnation. And in the case of the Swiss, having a reputation for safe banks and sound money became a major liability.

Here’s how it worked: When Greece entered its debt crisis at the end of 2009, and other European nations found themselves under severe stress, money seeking a safe haven began pouring into Switzerland. This in turn sent the Swiss franc soaring, with devastating effects on the competitiveness of Swiss manufacturing, and threatened to push Switzerland — which already had very low inflation and very low interest rates — into Japanese-style deflation.

So Swiss monetary officials went all out in an effort to weaken their currency. You might think that making your currency worth less is easy — can’t you just print more bills? — but in the post-crisis world it’s not easy at all. Just printing money and stuffing it into the banks does nothing; it just sits there. The Swiss tried a more direct approach, selling francs and buying euros on the foreign exchange market, in the process acquiring a huge hoard of euros. But even that wasn’t doing the trick.

Then, in 2011, the Swiss National Bank tried a psychological tactic. “The current massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc,” it declared, “poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy and carries the risk of a deflationary development.” And it therefore announced that it would set a minimum value for the euro — 1.2 Swiss francs — and that to enforce this minimum it was “prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities.” What the bank clearly hoped was that by drawing this line in the sand it would limit the number of euros it actually had to buy.

And for three years it worked. But on Thursday the Swiss suddenly gave up. We don’t know exactly why; nobody I know believes the official explanation, that it’s a response to a weakening euro. But it seems likely that a fresh wave of safe-haven money was making the effort to keep the franc down too expensive.

If you ask me, the Swiss just made a big mistake. But frankly — francly? — the fate of Switzerland isn’t the important issue. What’s important, instead, is the demonstration of just how hard it is to fight the deflationary forces that are now afflicting much of the world — not just Europe and Japan, but quite possibly China too. And while America has had a pretty good run the past few quarters, it would be foolish to assume that we’re immune.

What this says is that you really, really shouldn’t let yourself get too close to deflation — you might fall in, and then it’s extremely hard to get out. This is one reason that slashing government spending in a depressed economy is such a bad idea: It’s not just the immediate cost in lost jobs, but the increased risk of getting caught in a deflationary trap.

It’s also a reason to be very cautious about raising interest rates when you have low inflation, even if you don’t think deflation is imminent. Right now serious people — the same serious people who decided, wrongly, that 2010 was the year we should pivot from jobs to deficits — seem to be arriving at a consensus that the Fed should start hiking very soon. But why? There’s no sign of accelerating inflation in the actual data, and market indicators of expected inflation are plunging, suggesting that investors see deflationary risk even if the Fed doesn’t.

And I share that market concern. If the U.S. recovery weakens, either through contagion from troubles abroad or because our own fundamentals aren’t as strong as we think, tightening monetary policy could all too easily prove to be an act of utter folly.

So let’s learn from the Swiss. They’ve been careful; they’ve maintained sound money for generations. And now they’re paying the price.

IZJAVA DSP PROTI RAZPRODAJI

Društvo slovenskih pisateljev poziva Vlado in Državni zbor Republike Slovenije, da prekličeta lani sprejeti sklep o prodaji podjetij v državni lasti. Umik države iz podjetij nikakor ne sme pomeniti, da se uspešna podjetja prodajajo tujim državam ali podjetjem, katerih solastnik je druga država, s čimer se prodaja naša suverenost. Dolžnost vlade je, da omogoči takšno upravljanje podjetij, da bodo lahko ustvarjala nova delovna mesta, sofinancirala nove investicije in tako zagotovila ponovno gospodarsko rast, ki je pogoj socialnega miru in stabilnost naše družbe. S tem bo ohranjena gospodarska suverenost Slovenije, ki je pogoj naše državne suverenosti in nacionalne samozavesti. Slovenska kultura, temelj naše samobitnosti, lahko ohranja in gradi svoj pomen in moč, identiteto in neodvisnost le v suvereni državi, ki je ni brez močnega gospodarstva, kot je tudi ni brez slovenskega jezika. To so resnične prioritete, ki jih morata zagotoviti vlada in Državni zbor Republike Slovenije.

Upravni odbor Društva slovenskih pisateljev

Ljubljana, 10. januarja 2015.

Zagovor Anuške Delić
Odkar je postopek zoper mene prestopil prag tega sodišča, me kolegi, taksisti, prijatelji, znanci, neznanci sprašujejo: “Je to resen postopek?” Vsakič znova odgovorim, da imam sicer dobro intuicijo, a v tem primeru – ob iskrenem spoštovanju do navzočih v tej dvorani – res ne vem natančno, kdo vlada in kdo je dvorni norček.

Ovadba, ki me je privedla do današnjega zagovora, je bila neizpodbitno politična. Slovenska obveščevalno-varnostna agencija oziroma njen tedanji direktor Damir Črnčec, ki v prvih vrstah navija za točno določenega predsednika točno določene politične stranke, je po vseh dosedanjih informacijah zlorabila kazenski postopek za točno določeno partikularno, ne javno korist.

Nekdanji direktor Sove je po podatkih iz sodnega spisa v prvih dveh tednih na svoji novi funkciji na vrhu pomembnega državnega organa najprej sprožil interno preiskavo kot posledico mojih člankov v Delu. Menim, da je šlo zgolj in izključno za povračilni ukrep, ker sem si drznila pred državnozborskimi volitvami javno razobesiti umazano perilo pomembne politične stranke.

Moj zagovornik me je na pred obravnavnem naroku vprašal, če želim, da predlaga, naj tožilstvo odstopi od pregona. Za trenutek sem pomislila, nato pa sem dejala: “Naj kar končajo, kar so začeli!” Tožilstvo je imelo – potem ko je tožilka, ki je spisala obtožni predlog zoper mene, šla na bolniško in bila nato suspendirana zaradi nepovezanih kazenskih zadev – dovolj časa za premislek o tem, ali želi z nadaljevanjem pregona igrati statista v tej politični igri in pri zlorabi kazenskopravnih postopkov za partikularne interese. Lahko bi sámo odstopilo od pregona, pa ni.

In če se tožilstvu ni zdelo vredno prekiniti pregona zato, ker gre v tej zadevi za politizacijo državnih organov in institucij, bi lahko odstopilo od pregona zato, ker gre v prvi vrsti za napad na ustavno zagotovljeno svobodo izražanja, na novinarstvo in v splošnem na medije v domnevno demokratični državi. Novinarji v javnosti ne uživajo visokega zaupanja, nemalokrat utemeljeno in z dobrimi razlogi, toda v novinarskem cehu ni malo novinarjev, ki svoje delo opravljajo v skladu z najvišjimi poklicnimi standardi, ki objavljajo za javnost izjemno pomembne zgodbe, razkrivajo kriminal, korupcijo in, nenazadnje, zlorabe državnih institucij za uresničevanje partikularnih interesov.

Smešno je, da sem danes na zatožni klopi jaz, ne pa tisti, ki so zlorabili državne organe, katerih prva naloga je delovanje v interesu skupnosti. Tu ni tistih, ki že najmanj od leta 2010 gledajo stran, čeprav so zelo dobro seznanjeni z delovanjem neonacistične organizacije Blood and Honour. In smešno je, da pred sodnikom ležijo članki o neonacistih, namesto da bi pred njim stali tisti, ki so vedoma dopustili, da se taisti posamezniki infiltrirajo v varnostno najbolj občutljive državne sfere, kot sta policija in vojska. 2

II.

Po poklicu sem univerzitetna diplomirana novinarka. Na študij novinarstva sem se vpisala pri 25. letih, potem ko sem se vrnila v Slovenijo iz New Yorka, kjer sem prebivala slabih pet let. Po terorističnih napadih 11. septembra sem si dala mesec dni za premislek o tem, kaj želim od življenja.

V tednih po tem grozljivem dogodku sem namreč padla pod popoln vpliv poblaznelih ameriških medijev, ki so tako rekoč verbatim prenašali sporočila oblasti. Tisti časi so bili resda težki, a prav tedaj – še bolj pa pozneje, ko je bilo jasno, da je bil boj proti terorizmu oziroma boj za širjenje demokracije in svobode zasnovan na lažeh o obstoju orožja za množično uničevanje – sem spoznala, kako pomembna je zmožnost medijev, da znajo tudi v težkih trenutkih na aktualne zadeve pogledati s kritično distanco. Ne glede na ceno, ki jo bodo za to plačali. Odločila sem se, da se vrnem v Slovenijo in se vpišem na študij novinarstva.

Skoraj deset let po tem, ko sem za Delo napisala prvo poročilo s tiskovne konference, ki je minila v znamenju pošiljanja poslank na pregled mednožja, ugotavljam, da smo še vedno nezrela demokracija.

V tem času sem kot novinarka med drugim razgalila uradnike na oddelku za šolstvo Mestne občine Ljubljana, ki so nato ostali brez službe, obstoj rakotvornega mehko vezanega azbesta na vlakih Slovenskih železnic, o katerem so odgovorni trdili, da ga sploh ni več, objavila sem prvi članek o dogajanju v zvezi s 6. blokom Termoelektrarne Šoštanj, pisala sem o zlorabah v Dravskih elektrarnah Maribor, ki so odnesle tedanjega direktorja, organizirani združbi, ki opravlja črne likvidacije podjetij, ter nenazadnje o brez plačnikih Slovenski tednik in Ekspres, za katera se je izkazalo, da sta bila de facto nelegalna politična kampanja določenih političnih strank. V zvezi z zadnjo tematiko, zanimivo, nikoli ni odgovarjal in ne bo odgovarjal nihče.

Simptom nezrele demokracije niso le novinarji, ki ne delujejo v imenu javnosti, ampak tudi epidemija neodgovornosti za dokazano najmanj sumljiva, če ne že kazniva dejanja. V skladu s ponarodelo krilatico, da vsaka svinjarija še ni kaznivo dejanje, se v Sloveniji pravosodno orožje najraje uperja v tiste, ki svinjarijo razgalijo. In zato sem tu jaz, novinarka, ki sem delovala v skladu s poklicnimi standardi in zakonodajo Republike Slovenije.

Zaradi gonje proti meni sem morala aktivno preiskovanje desnega ekstremizma resda za nekaj časa postaviti na stranski tir, toda zdaj, ko vem, da v Sloveniji obstaja sodnik, ki je tožilstvu preprečil dostop do prometnih podatkov mojega telefona, s čimer bi bili lahko komprimitirani vsi moji viri, lahko svoje delo nemoteno opravljam dalje. Temu sodniku ali sodnici sem dolžna iskreno zahvalo. Ravnal oziroma ravnala je v duhu enega izmed temeljnih načel demokracije – da so mediji svobodni. 3

III.

V časniku Delo in na spletnem portalu delo.si sem 1. in 2. decembra 2011 objavila tri članke, v katerih sem opozorila na sprego desne politike in desnega ekstremizma.

Kratkovidno bi bilo zatiskati si oči pred obstojem ekstremističnih skupin, ki jih družijo protiustavna stališča o prevladi bele rase, zanikanju holokavsta in poveličevanju nacizma. Porast ekstremizma v državah Evropske unije je dejstvo. V Evropskem parlamentu trenutno sedijo evroposlanci Velike Britanije, ki so zagovorniki skrajnih političnih idej. Politični stranki Jobbik na Madžarskem in Zlata zora v Grčiji sta dejanska, ne fantomska fenomena, postajata politični sili doma in v Evropi – z glasovi volivcev.

Če pustimo ob strani člen Kazenskega zakonika, ki prepoveduje javno spodbujanje nestrpnosti, in zavržna neonacistična stališča, je prav v zavestnih glasovih volivcev razlika med transparentnim udejstvovanjem skrajnih političnih sil in v njihovem delovanju iz zasede. Moji članki so dokazali prav to, da pri nas ekstremna desnica deluje iz zasede, da se je zlila s članstvom najmočnejše politične stranke na desnici. Zato je bilo razgaljenje tega dejstva v neizpodbitnem interesu javnosti, volivcev in volivk, državljanov Republike Slovenije. Če tega dejstva ne bi javno obelodanila, bi si zaslužila kazensko ovadbo. Tako pa sem ravnala kot odgovorna članica novinarskega ceha in kot zavedna državljanka Republike Slovenije, katere temelj je ustavno zagotovljena enakopravnost in spoštovanje človekovih pravic.

Poleg političnih povezav se je skozi moje raziskovanje tedaj (delno pa tudi pozneje) potrdilo tudi to, da so člani oziroma simpatizerji slovenskega krila neformalno organizirane neonacistične organizacije Blood and Honour dejavni v Slovenski vojski in policiji. Vojska je tedaj, leta 2011, po morilskem pohodu Norvežana Andersa Breivika, izvedla notranjo preiskavo, a ni odkrila neonacističnih elementov, oziroma, če sem natančna, ni odkrila pripadnikov Slovenske vojske, ki bi kršili kazensko zakonodajo.

Ker neonacistično združevanje v Sloveniji ni prepovedano, temveč je prepovedano “le” javno spodbujanje k nestrpnosti, sovražnosti, poveličevanje nacizma, zanikanje holokavsta in propagiranje prevlade bele rase, OVS ministrstva za obrambo pod vodstvom Črnčca seveda ni našla in ni mogla najti “pripadnikov, ki bi kršili kazensko zakonodajo”. To pa ne pomeni, da neonacističnih privržencev v Slovenski vojski ni.

In četudi je tedanja obrambna ministrica Ljubica Jelušič na svojem blogu vsakršno povezovanje neonacistov s Slovensko vojsko označila za črno propagando in zapisala, da lahko vojaki v prostem času počno, kar želijo, pa je dejstvo, da tovrstno udejstvovanje slovenskim vojakom prepoveduje Kodeks Slovenske vojske. Po delovnopravni zakonodaji pa so vojaki dolžni tudi v prostem času ravnati tako, da ne škodijo ugledu svojega delodajalca. 4

Če prostočasno udejstvovanje vojakov v neonacističnih organizacijah ne škodi ugledu Slovenske vojske, ki je tako kot vsi drugi zavezana Ustavi in pravnemu sistemu Republike Slovenije, potem je treba na zatožno klop posesti tiste, ki teh kršitev v notranji preiskavi niso odkrili. Toliko bolj v luči informacij v sodnem spisu, ki dokazujejo, da je Sova te povezave odkrila in je o njih tudi obvestila OVS.

Enako velja za policijo, v okviru katere sem sicer šele pred meseci odkrila vezni člen med neonacističnimi privrženci in Centrom za varovanje in zaščito v okviru Policije. Kar zadeva vojsko, pa sem že v člankih leta 2011 pa tudi pozneje objavila, da so uredništvu znana imena vojakov, ki so dejavni v ali pa najmanj simpatizirajo z Blood and Honour.

Nenazadnje je bil o tej problematiki ves čas in redno obveščen najožji vrh slovenske države, a je bil dosedanji odziv omejen na ustanovitev parlamentarne preiskovalne komisije o ekstremizmu, ki naj bi v prvem delu ugotovila potrebe po spremembi zakonodaje, v drugem pa naj bi se ukvarjala s političnimi povezavami neonacističnih organizacij. Toda delo komisije sta že v prvem delu zavrli dve politični stranki – tista, ki sem jo v člankih razgalila, in tista, katere obrambna ministrica je govorjenje o obstoju neonacistov v Slovenski vojski označila za črno propagando.

Drugi odziv države je bil začetek pregona zoper mene. 5

IV.

Specializirano državno tožilstvo mi v obtožnem predlogu očita, da sem kontinuirano pridobivala tajne podatke Sove z naklepom, da bi jih objavila v člankih. Trdi, da sem podatke pridobila protipravno. Kolikor razumem 260. člen Kazenskega zakonika, je objava tajnih podatkov brez dovoljenja državnega organa, ki je informacije označil s stopnjo zaupnosti, kaznivo dejanje. Toda kolikor razumem postopek, ki se vodi proti meni, mora tožilstvo najprej dokazati, da sem sploh razpolagala s tajnimi podatki, da sem jih nato objavila.

Ne vem, kako kani tožilstvo to dokazati, a dejstvo je, da sem preiskovalno delo opravila sama – v skladu s povsem navadnimi novinarskimi metodami.

Po morilskem pohodu Andersa Breivika, zlasti pa oktobra, ko je bila v ljubljanskem klubu Inbox zabava ob 10. obletnici Blood and Honour Slovenija, o čemer je poročal Pop TV, se je v medijih pa tudi med novinarji pojavilo veliko zanimivih informacij in namigov. Sklenila sem, da bom šla po sledeh teh namigov. Informacije, ki sem jih pridobila, sem preverjala s pomočjo javno dostopnih podatkov in logičnega sklepanja, pa tudi pri človeških virih – vseh mojih sogovornikov je bilo okrog deset. Vse ključne informacije, na katerih bi zgodba obstala ali padla v vodo, sem poskusila neodvisno preveriti prek javno dostopnih virov informacij in pri neodvisnih človeških virih. Prav tako sem pridobila odzive ključnih akterjev v zgodbi.

Do konkretnih očitkov tožilstva, ki izhajajo iz obtožnega predloga, se bom opredelila pri branju dokazov obrambe, ko bom tudi podrobneje predstavila tisti del mojega preiskovanja, ki temelji na javno dostopnih podatkih. Toda ne danes ne pozneje ne bom odgovarjala na vprašanja, ki se posredno ali neposredno dotikajo mojih človeških virov. Ne bom govorila ne o tistih, ki so bili moji viri, ne o tistih, ki niso bili.

Dogovor o anonimnosti novinarjevega vira je – ob predpostavki, da ima vir utemeljene razloge za strah pred razkritjem njegove ali njene identitete – temelj novinarskega dela. In te tihe pogodbe z mojimi viri ne bom prekršila, ker bi s tem zanikala pomen novinarskih standardov in ogrozila življenja tistih, ki so kljub morebitnim pomislekom z menoj delili svoje védenje o tej zadevi.

Ponavljam, da sem delo opravila v skladu s Kodeksom novinarjev Slovenije in s Kazenskim zakonikom, pri čemer prvo dokazuje tudi to, da po objavi člankov uredništvo Dela po mojih podatkih ni dobilo niti enega zahtevka za objavo popravka ali odgovora. Klical nas je le oče ene izmed deklet, ki je ovekovečena na fotografiji ob obisku gorenjske delegacije Slovenske demokratske mladine v Državnem zboru, ki se ga je udeležil tudi vodja slovenske Blood and Honour, češ da ni bilo prav, da obrazov drugih obiskovalcev nismo prekrili. Gospodu smo se opravičili, opravičilo pa smo objavili tudi v časniku Delo in na portalu delo.si.

Po moji presoji predmetna kazenska zadeva sodišču ne daje vzvoda za to, da bi zahtevalo, naj razkrijem identitete svojih virov. Toda kljub temu želim še enkrat poudariti, da virov ne bom razkrila in da o njih ne bom govorila. Novinarstvo brez virov je hendikepirano početje, ki ne služi nikomur drugemu kot le centrom moči, ki naj bi jih prav mediji nadzirali. Nedavno se je nekdanji minister na enem izmed spletnih portalov na podlagi paranoidne manipulacije, objavljene na drugem portalu, katere namen je bila diskreditacija mene, mojega kolega in vira v nepovezani zadevi, razpisal o tem, da bi morali novinarji razkriti svoje vire. Ni pa zapisal, če se strinja s tem, da bi novinarji razgalili njega, kadar bi kateremu od nas povedal kaj, kar bi ga lahko spravilo v resne težave.

Novinarji, kot že rečeno, v javnosti ne uživamo visokega ugleda, zato je pridobivanje dobro obveščenih virov pogosto težko. A tiste, ki tvegajo, smo dolžni zaščititi. Žvižgače preganjajo povsod po svetu in preganjajo jih tudi v Sloveniji, vendar sem na zatožni klopi jaz, ne žvižgač, in tako je tudi prav. Če je že treba koga preganjati, je treba preganjati prinašalce novic in informacij, vsi drugi dobijo imuniteto, se izogibajo zapornim kaznim, žalijo sodnike, prirejajo bilance, se prek davčnih oaz izogibajo plačevanju davkov, organizirajo javne manifestacije proti slovenskim sodiščem in najedajo že tako šibke temelje slovenske pravne države. Krivi smo kakopak tisti, ki jih poskušamo zaščititi. 7

v.

Očitki tožilstva implicirajo, da sem v času, ko sem preiskovala zadevo, zaradi katere stojim tu pred vami, nabrala kup dokumentov Sove in da brez fantomskega žvižgača člankov sploh ne bi bilo. Še več, trdi, da sem z njimi celo ogrozila obstoj in nadaljnje delo Sove.

To me zelo skrbi. Dejstvo je namreč, da so se informacije o delovanju Blood and Honour, ki sem jih pridobila leta 2011 in vse do danes, potrdile v dokumentih, ki jih je tožilstvo predložilo v kazenski spis. Vse informacije, tudi tiste, ki jih še nisem objavila in novinarsko obdelala. To, da sem kot novinarka s pomočjo klasičnih metod novinarskega dela pridobila iste ali podobne informacije, kot jih je pridobila Sova, me navdaja s svojevrstnim ponosom zaradi dobro opravljenega dela. In s skrbjo za kakovost dela Sove. Če lahko ena navadna novinarka z okrnjenimi preiskovalnimi metodami nabere iste informacije kot obveščevalno-varnostna agencija z vsem svojim aparatom in zmogljivostmi, potem se je treba vprašati, kakšno agencijo imamo. Toliko bolj, če naj bi taista novinarka celo ogrozila obstoj take agencije.

Enkrat za vselej: v času preiskovanja slovenskih neonacistov nisem niti videla niti brala niti v rokah držala niti enega dokumenta Sove. Nikoli. Prav tako nisem bila na nikakršen način opozorjena ali obveščena, da operiram s tajnimi podatki. Več o tem ni mogoče reči, ker bi bilo to tratenje časa za govorjenje o nečem, kar ne obstaja.

Je pa treba v zvezi z očitki tožilstva o mojemu protipravnemu, naklepnemu in sploh protidržavnemu zbiranju tajnih podatkov dodati, da sem se res od srca nasmejala, ko sem v obtožnem predlogu prebrala, da sem po oceni tožilstva oziroma Sove v člankih objavila tudi napačne informacije, s katerimi je prav tako razpolagala Sova. In to naj bi, bojda, tožilstvo zgolj še utrdilo v prepričanju, da sem godna za kazenski pregon. V obtožnem predlogu piše, da sem v članku napačno navedla, da je na 10. obletnici Blood and Honour Slovenija nastopila ruska neonacistična glasbena skupina Kolovrat. In da sem napačno navedla dan neonacistične manifestacije Day of Honour (Dan časti) na Madžarskem.

Draga Sova, drago tožilstvo, na spletu sem našla letaka za oba dogodka. In za to nisem potrebovala fantomskega žvižgača s Sove. To velja tudi za moje preostalo delo na tej zadevi. 8

VI.

Spoštovani gospod sodnik, ta proces je grotesken. Država me preganja zato, ker sem opravila svoje delo profesionalno, odgovorno, skladno z novinarskim kodeksom in zakonodajo. Ampak ni problema, vlogo dvornega norčka sem ponotranjila in bom po svoji vesti sodelovala v tem procesu, ki ga je zmontirala politična stranka. Ne želim komentirati ravnanja sodišča, toda vi, spoštovana tožilka, ste imeli druge in drugačne možnosti.

Danes smo vsi v istem ekonomloncu. Če se bo v njem naposled skuhalo kaj koristnega za to zavoženo državo, naš čas ne bo porabljen zaman. In to sodišče ne bo predmet javnega zgražanja.

Tu smo zato, ker Republika Slovenija vsaj od leta 2010 ni imela poguma, da bi uredila področje protiustavnih organizacij, ki nestrpnost, sovražnost do drugih, neonacistična prepričanja in zaigrano domoljubje razširjajo med vse mlajšimi državljani in državljankami. Sprejmejo jih v organizacijo s simbolno ustreznim imenom Tukaj je Slovenija, nakar jih pripravljajo, urijo in usposabljajo zato, da bodo v slovenskem krilu svetovne organizacije Blood and Honour speča celica neke politične stranke. Ta politična stranka teh posameznikov do danes še ni izvrgla iz svojih vrst, nasprotno, vse bolj so vključeni v njeno delovanje.

A tudi če se neonacisti ne bi prek zadnjih vrat vključili v politično delovanje, je obstoj neformalne neonacistične skupine, ki se zaposluje v Slovenski vojski in policiji, ima torej dostop do notranjih informacij v teh organih, in ki je pripravljena na ulicah nasilno obračunati z drugače mislečimi ali z nasprotniki njihovih političnih idolov, kot se je to zgodilo pred dvema letoma med mirnimi protesti zoper vlado, resnična grožnja nacionalni varnosti Republike Slovenije. Zlasti, če je ta obstoj nenadzorovan in brez vsakršnih zakonskih omejitev. Jaz ta grožnja prav gotovo nisem.

Anuška Delić