Author Archives: Igor Koršič

Cerkvene finance / Sveti nered

 

Church finances: Holy disorder

By Alex Barker in Maribor

The bankruptcy of a Catholic diocese that diversified into business reflects scant supervision
Stained Glass window depicting Money Making. Image shot 2007. Exact date unknown.©AlamyMinting money: coin making in a stained glass window

Father Joze Golovsek is praying for a bailout. But if it comes to the worst and the banks seize his church, he can take solace from knowing they cannot asset-strip the angels.

“It is protected as a cultural heritage,” says the priest, wistfully looking up at the pastel pink and yellow hues of the handsome baroque building in Maribor, Slovenia’s second city. “Any new owner wouldn’t be allowed to resell the relics inside. They can’t dismantle the altar and remove the panorama of holy St Aloysius, or take away the angels.”

Warning signs

Warning signs

Trouble for Slovenia

This 18th century house of God is at risk of repossession not because of the prohibitive cost of repairs but as a result of the commercial misadventures of its clergy. The Archdiocese of Maribor is bankrupt, unable to pay its debts and at the mercy of its creditors. Father Golovsek’s church may pay the price.

The Roman Catholic Church is no stranger to financial troubles. Yet by sheer size, the collapse of Maribor diocese and its associated investment funds – Zvon Ena and Zvon Dva (Bell One and Bell Two) – is one of the biggest to blight the modern Church. Total claims have reached up to €1bn – all that for a small city of 114,000 souls nestled in the lush foothills of the Pohorje mountains.

The events that put St Aloysius into receivership and rocked Slovenia involve unchecked entrepreneurial spirits, arms-length financing, soft porn, a runaway bubble and suspected demonic possession. Already three bishops have resigned and a priest turned financial wizard is facing jail.

For Slovenia, it is a painful reminder of – and a contributor to – the go-go years of the past that have left its economy today on the brink of a eurozone bailout. For the Vatican, now under a Pontiff battling the “idolatry of money”, it is a stark lesson in the perils of hands-off management.

The Church in Slovenia is still reeling. “These events are the fruits of ploys by mysterious evil forces,” said Monsignor Andrej Glavan, president of the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, last year. “Rationally it is difficult to grasp and understand.”

St Aloysius’s problems stem from being pledged as collateral, along with the bishop’s seat in Maribor’s main square, assorted vineyards, an organ workshop and a disused monastery. These scant assets underpinned an epic financial folly, a sprawling enterprise funded in part by priests urging their flock to entrust the Church with the privatisation certificates they received after Slovenia broke from Yugoslavia and threw off communism. Some 60,000 heeded their call.

Through the two Zvon funds, the diocese stood astride an investment empire spanning publishing, paint manufacturing, glassworks, water parks, telecommunications, Croatian property and a slaughterhouse in Buenos Aires. Paper gains in an overheated stock market secured loans to expand further. When the boom collapsed, so did most investment funds. The Zvons stood out because of their Church ties: this was not a religious institution struggling to manage inherited wealth but a ruinous attempt at building a fortune from scratch.

The final tally from the failure is hard to pin down. Although total claims lodged in the bankruptcy process exceed €1bn, a more accurate figure is perhaps roughly €500m in net loans from banks. By comparison, the Holy See’s annual administration budget is about €250m. It is a remarkable sum given, under Vatican rules, any loans in excess of €1m require Rome’s approval.

Blame for the calamity is heaped on Mirko Krasovec, a canny priest who acted as Maribor’s treasurer for almost a quarter of a century. As the bankruptcy hit in 2011, Krasovec was banished to an Austrian monastery and last month sentenced to two years in jail for a role in embezzling EU grants – a guilty verdict against which he is appealing. While admitting mistakes, he insists he is no more than a scapegoat. His critics are less generous. Anton Guzej, a banker with whom he formerly worked, said: “He always behaved like a baron. His methods were those of Slovenian tycoons.” Krasovec declined to comment.

It is an unlikely fate for a man born to a modest farming family in which four out of five brothers entered the priesthood. He showed an enterprising spirit from a young age, whether making his own shoes or pianos. He was trained in theology, not economics, but impressed as a parish priest when managing a renovation project. In 1985 he took over as treasurer, shepherding Maribor through a critical transition.

The demise of Tito’s Yugoslavia was the Church’s opportunity to reclaim what it had lost. Communist partisans saw the bishops as the enemy within, a permanent threat, tarred with collaborating with fascists during the second world war. Once a state within a state – with football clubs, schools and hospitals – the Church was left with almost nothing. Persecution was relentless. In 1953 Anton Vovk, Ljubljana’s archbishop, was doused in petrol and set alight in the street. The wounds inflicted on Slovenian society are still raw.

As Slovenia seceded in 1991, Krasovec’s sharp instincts proved invaluable. He built connections overseas and opened Krekova, a successful savings bank, which was bought by Austria’s Raiffeisenbank for about €30m in 2002. Relative to Ljubljana, its episcopal big brother, Maribor fared poorly from the restitution of property. Jealousy was rife; Krasovec was the priest with the nous to close that gap. Clerics recall his predecessor saying: “As an old-style treasurer I dealt with the money I had. My successor is dealing with the money he thinks he will have some day.”

A pivotal decision was to collect certificates granted to Slovenes during mass privatisation, which had a notional value of €1,500-€3,000. Priests throughout Slovenia were enlisted to help. St Stanislaus Institute, Slovenia’s top Catholic education institute, claimed that investing with the Church “out of love” would bring “inner joy, now and in eternity”. “God who sees in secret will reward you,” it said.

In the early days, Maribor fared well. While most certificates were badly invested, it oversaw a blue-chip fund that soared as Slovenia moved into the eurozone in 2004. The main market index jumped 500 per cent between 2003 and 2007 – a rise that was eventually wiped out. Simon Zdolsek, the former head of Zvon Ena, said: “We all made a mistake – Zvon and the banks and the Church – because we believed in this boom.”

Krasovec, in an interview with the Delo newspaper before his banishment, said: “It is like you have sown wheat and then the crop is destroyed by hail and at the same time the barn is burnt. Had anyone warned us this would happen, we would never have done it.”

Like many investment funds, the Zvons borrowed too much. Certain decisions made the fallout worse for the bishops. One was to take a controlling stake in the Zvons in 2005 via a vehicle named Gospodarstvo Rast. Legally, there was a distinction but the Zvons were bound to the Church. Another problem was failing to prevent Zvon’s management from straying into more speculative investments. And then there was T2.

It was pornography, in the end, that alerted the Vatican. In late 2007, T2, a company controlled by Zvon Ena, sought to muscle in on the Slovenian television market with a 120-channel package – including several adult offerings. One banker joked that it offered the “finest pornography in Slovenia”. But for the archbishop of Maribor, this was no laughing matter. The morality of its investments was being debated in public.

. . .

There are conflicting accounts of whether Pope Benedict raised the matter directly. But in 2008 when Slovenia’s bishops visited Rome, the message was clear: the porn and financial escapades must stop. The Pontiff preached to the assembled Slovenian bishops in their black cassocks and purple cincture bands on “greater fidelity to the Gospel in the administration of Church property”.

Over time it became apparent that T2’s soft porn was one of its more astute commercial decisions. Its big misjudgment was attempting to build its own telecoms infrastructure across Slovenia – an unfinished and ultimately ruinous goal. The market turned when the project was at its most vulnerable; banks took fright. It was Zvon’s biggest asset and the key to the downfall.

While the Vatican’s suspicions of Maribor were raised in 2008, it took three years for the Holy See to take charge, eventually calling in NM Rothschild, its advisers, ordering an inquiry and ousting three bishops. Even now in Slovenia there is open criticism of Pope Francis for last summer pushing out Monsignor Anton Stres, a popular cleric who became archbishop of Ljubljana after serving in Maribor.

Krasovec argues that he was given strategic direction by the bishops he served. They approved the strategy and backed the crucial decisions, he claims. The problem was the leap into the capitalist markets, not the execution.

In a 30-page letter to clergy leaked to the newspaper Dnevnik by a source other than its author, Krasovec said he “accepted the role of scapegoat”. “But the twisting of the truth goes too far . . . this unjustified blackening of my name will not let the Church save face”.

Aftershocks continue. More prosecutions are possible. Alenka Bratusek, Slovenia’s centre-left prime minister, said the scandal was “amazing”. “We are conducting forensic searches now in our banks so that those that did on purpose commit any wrongs will be brought before the judges.”

Creditors are expecting back only a fraction of their claims. Debate is raging within the Church over compensation for faithful investors. Bogdan Knavs, a Franciscan friar born in Maribor, openly argued regret alone would not absolve the sin of recklessly squandering “savings of small people”. “If this injustice is not settled . . . the stain will blight the Church for decades,” he wrote.

The bishops are standing firm. In their eyes the responsibility is limited: other dioceses are not answerable for Maribor’s errors; Maribor was legally separate from the investment companies; and investors were given several opportunities to cash out. Msgr Glavan said the compensation demands were “unreasonable” given that the Maribor archdiocese “completely depends on its beggar’s stick”.

A neighbouring Austrian diocese may yet intervene to save St Aloysius, and perhaps the bishop’s seat. The Church is painfully aware of the reputational hit it has suffered; a few yards from St Aloysius church are walls daubed with names of church leaders and swastikas. The resentment runs deep.

“I learnt something about the church,” said Zoran Zeljic, a psychologist who invested late in Zvon. “At every mass there is confession, recognition of sin. It is ritual, they say it but they don’t mean it, life goes on as before. They are hiding, hiding from moral responsibility, hiding behind legal structures, hiding from what they owe.”

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Church and society: The threat of the satanic red dragon

The ruin of the Maribor archdiocese is a parable for Slovenia as it struggles with the hangover of a runaway boom and the unhealed divisions of history. The country of just 2m people, squeezed between the Adriatic and the Alps, faces its biggest crisis since independence as the bills from a decade of excess and political negligence come due.

Once feted as the great success of post-communist transition, Slovenia has been brought low by corporate cronyism, lax lending and a state that still looms large over the economy.

The clerics of Maribor were far from alone in being swept along in an unsustainable bubble. But their downfall has bitterly divided a society still grappling with the legacy of the second world war and 50 years of communism.

“The red dragon relentlessly attacks,” said Monsignor Andrej Glavan, the Bishop of Novo Mesto, evoking the seven-headed beast of the Book of Revelations. “Satan exploits the weaknesses and failures of one of the six dioceses . . . to mount an attack on the entire Church in Slovenia.”

Ivan Stuhec, a prominent theologian, said: “My opinion remains that the Zvons could have been saved. If we could have saved the Zvons we could have saved Rast [the Church holding company] and with that we would have saved the archdiocese.”

The Zvons were in better shape than other Slovenian funds that collapsed. Companies it backed are still prospering. But Slovenian stocks fell 40 per cent after the Zvons declared bankruptcy. Any white knight for Maribor needed deep pockets.

People involved in the final days say a Vatican-brokered loan was close – even provisionally accepted – before it was scuppered by a mysterious intervention. Banks later demanded collateral from other dioceses, leaving some suspecting a plot against the entire Church.

Mr Stuhec has previously denounced lobbies attempting to “behead” the Church. “I don’t think the trap was set for us,” he said. “The people within the Church strayed so far that they could be captured. And when they were already in the trap it was of course exploited by opponents of the Church.”

Additional reporting: Urban Cervek and Caroline Bauman

 

Škandal na Šentflorjanskem. In Tišina.

Upravni odbor Prešernovega sklada je podelil nagrado filmu Pedro Opeka, dober prijatelj. Dejanje je sprožilo tipično šentflorjansko debato o tem, ali je bilo to dejanje v skladu z zakoni, pravilniki in uzancami ali ni. O tem, da gre za škandalozno politično in s stroko skregano poseganje v umetnost brez primere, je kot običajno v takih primerih, pretežno tiho.  Upravni odbor Prešernovega sklada, katerega člani imajo  imena in priimke so zagrešil, kaj naj rečem, vnebovpijoče škandalozni  izbor, skregan s samimi temelji filmske in ne samo filmske  stroke. Kljub temu se odzivi in razprave  usmerijajo vstran od tega primarnega dejstva, denimo  na (prastare) načelne in proceduralne probleme. Tako so člani upravnega odbora Prešernovega sklada, strokovnjaki s področja kulture, svoj umazani strankarsko politični posel opravili brez posledic. Po drugi strani so izpostavljeni  člani strokovne komisije, ki so korektno opravili svojo nalogo. Ne gre za konkretno politiko, ampak za samo dejstvo, da je odločitev politična. Enako škandalozno bi bilo, če bi nagradili slab film o ne vem kakšni socialistični solidarnosti. Gre za načelno vprašanje o svobodi in avtonomnosti umetnosti. Komunisti v prejšnjem enopartijskem sistemu so si avtonomijo umetnosti redko dovolili tako flagrantno zanikati.  Vsekakor sta si  umetnost in kultura po drugi vojni postopno izbojevali kar dostojno neodvisnost od politike. Če o regresiji ob tokratnem dogodku molčimo, pristajamo na degradacijo že izbojevanih civilizacijskih standardov. Posledica so napadi civilizacijsko regresivnih sil, ki že zahtevajo izredno sejo Odbora za kulturo in se bodo še naprej zaletavali v neodzivno truplo predstavnikov demokracije, laične države in osnovnih civilizacijskih norm.  Preračunljivo taktiziranje o tako fundamentalnih stvareh ni samo nespodobno ampak se tudi ne izplača.

“Nekoč, na primer, so se bili spoprijeli zaradi vprašanja, kako da je izreči krvavo geslo: »Vse zbil!« Nekateri v kotu so kratkomalo zahtevali, da je treba govoriti, kakor je napi­sano: »Vse zbilj!« Drugi so ugovarjali; treba da je reči: »Vse zbou!« Nekdo se je celo oglasil s svojo posebno mo­drostjo: »Vse zbiv!« To imenitno vprašanje še nikakor ni bilo razrešeno, ko so načeli že drugo: če bi, na primer, pisali fonetično, ali naj bi tedaj pisali »vse zbou«, ali »vse zbov«; oziroma »vse zbiv«, ali »vse zbiu«. Toliko, da ni prišlo do hudega tepeža; vprašanje samo pa je obtičalo tam, kjer tiči dandanašnji.

V drugem kotu so ob taistem času onegavili mnogo višji problem. Če je namreč gledališka umetnost nujno potrebna za blagor človeštva; in če je, čemu da je. Na koncu je ostalo sredi staje tisto, kar ostane ob rešetanju vsakega kulturnega vprašanja: smrdeč kupček hinavščine. In iz kupčka, tega smrdečega, zraste nov problem: kdo da ga je bil naredil.” Ivan Cankar: Tišina.

 

Igor Koršič

Trmasto gnila država

Dokler se bo ta družba sprenevedala, da je pri nas, kljub ignoriranju lanskoletnega poročila KPKa, letošnjem odstopu senata in enoletnih neargumentiranih in pobalisnkih diskreditacijah tega nadzornega organa, pri nas vse v redu, se slovenska kriza ne more niti začeti sanirati.  Smo globoko bolna družba in država. Pika.

Igor Koršič

Leto dni od protikorupcijske »atomske bombe«

Napoved, da bomo priče bitke za interpretacijo in diskreditacijo poročila ter članov KPK, se je uresničila.

Rok Kajzer, Ozadja

Delo
sre, 08.01.2014, 06:00

 

Ljubljana – »When numbers talk, bullshit walks – v prevodu: ko začnejo govoriti dejstva, ne bi smelo biti več prostora za politično demagogijo, celo v Sloveniji ne,« je 8. januarja 2013 dejal predsednik KPKGoran Klemenčič. Leto dni pozneje: dejstva poražena, demagogija zmagovalka.

Ko se je senat protikorupcijske komisije (KPK) pred natančno letom dni pojavil pred mikrofoni in kamerami, ni skoraj nihče slutil, da Goran Klemenčič, Rok Praprotnik in Lilijana Selinšek prinašajo politično »atomsko bombo«.

Poročilo o (nepojasnjenem) premoženjskem stanju je bilo katastrofalno za takratnega premieraJaneza Janšo in ljubljanskega župana Zorana Jankovića. Leto dni pozneje je jasno, da sta bila oba akterja dovolj daleč od ničelne točke eksplozije, ki ju je le oplazila.

Janša je sicer izgubil premierski položaj in vlado ter dolgoročno tudi možnost, da bi sestavil še kakšen ministrski kabinet, a je ostal trdno v sedlu najmočnejše opozicijske stranke SDS. Jankovića je bolj kakor ne navidezno odpihnilo s položaja predsednika PS, županski položaj pa je s podporo stranke in svoje mestne liste v celoti ohranil.

Oba sta politično preživela, ne da bi vsaj približno zadovoljivo pojasnila izvor svojega premoženja. Po objavi sta izvedla klasični slovenski politični manever in se s poročilom nista spopadla z argumenti, papirji, številkami in verodostojnimi pojasnili, ampak z obtoževanjem, blatenjem in diskreditacijo KPK, v čemer je SDS sicer vodila pred PS.

Klemenčič je ob objavi poročila dejal (in hkrati že napovedal usodo vodstva KPK): »Posledice so lahko le dvojne: ali nas vse zaprejo, ker smo neutemeljeno očrnili najvišje predstavnike države, ali pa se sprejmejo odgovornost in ustrezni ukrepi. V nasprotnem primeru nima nobenega smisla več, da komisija še obstaja.« Odgovornosti in ukrepov ni bilo, je pa nato, tudi zaradi drugih razlogov, odšla komisija.

Čeprav slovesa hudo obremenjenih politikov ni bilo, je imelo poročilo blagodejne učinke za demokracijo: državljani so imeli prvič v zgodovini mlade države vpogled v drobovje nepojasnjenega premoženja pomembnih politikov, korupcija je postala tema številka 1 in končno je prišel trenutek za spoznanje, da v državi ne more biti več nedotakljivih.

Poročilo je pri tem prineslo še širitev protestniškega gibanja proti oholim in korumpiranim političnim elitam in je s padcem vlade tudi zaznamovalo celotno leto 2013. Država je dobila nov ministrski kabinet in na novo so se pomešale politične karte.

Leto podlih in neargumentiranih diskreditacij

»Naš komentar na dogajanje v letu po objavi poročila o premoženjskem stanju je v celoti zajet v naši odstopni izjavi in v 15 predlogih za soočenje s sistemsko korupcijo, ki smo jih podali ob odstopu,« je izjava senata KPK ob današnji prvi obletnici izdaje poročila.

Na račune Zorana Jankovića se je, odkar je postal župan Ljubljane, zlilo okoli 2,8 milijona evrov; komisiji jih ni prijavil. Večina sredstev je prišla iz družinskih podjetij. Župan trdi, da mu sinova odplačujeta odkup Electe holdinga. Ko mu je zmanjkalo denarja, je praviloma prišlo nakazilo iz teh družb. »Ko potrebujem denar, pokličem pa rečem, dragi moj sine, je čas, da kaj vrneš atu … Približno tako to izgleda,« je pojasnjeval Janković, ki je po izračunih na leto porabil tudi do 11-krat več, kakor je zaslužil. Nič kaj prepričljivo pa ni mogel pojasniti verižnega prenakazovanja denarja od Grepa, ki je posloval z ljubljansko občino. Višina: 208.000 evrov.

Nezadostna pojasnila

KPK je pri Janezu Janši ugotovila, da se je njegovo premoženje od leta 2004 nesorazmerno in nepojasnjeno povečalo za vsaj 210.000 evrov. Precej financiranja je bilo z velikimi količinami gotovine, o kateri pa ni znano, kdaj, kako in od koga jo je dobil. Janša se je precej zapletel pri transakcijah pri nakupu stanovanja v Ljubljani in nakupu hiše v Silovi pri Velenju. Številke, ki jih je predstavil KPK, se niso ujemale s podatki komisije. Prav tako ni zadovoljivo pojasnil financiranja potovanj, sodnih taks in nakupa vozila, katerega vrednost je bila veliko višja od tiste, ki jo je prijavil. KPK je opozorila tudi na 100.000 evrov premoženjske koristi, ki jo je pridobil od družbe Imos, ki je preplačala zemljišče v Trenti.

Preverljivo lažna

Oba sta ugotovitvam oporekala, jih zavračala in poudarjala, da nista imela možnosti ugovora. KPK jima je dala več možnosti, da podata svoja pojasnila, vendar so bila ta po Klemenčičevih besedah izmikajoča, nepopolna in tudi »preverljivo lažna«. Oba sta na upravno sodišče vložila tožbo zaradi poročila, poleg tega sta zahtevala njegovo začasno zadržanje, vendar pri tem nista bila uspešna, niti na vrhovnem sodišču ne.

Nespodobna bitka

»KPK, ki dela in živi v tej državi, ne dvomi, da se bo v prihodnjih dneh in tednih začela bitka za interpretacijo, verjetno bomo tudi priče diskreditacije poročila, postopka in mogoče celo posameznih ali vseh članov,« je razplet takoj po objavi poročila napovedal Klemenčič. Niti najmanj se ni zmotil.

Šest dni po objavi poročila smo v Delu v članku Kronologija neke diskreditacije analizirali odnos Janše in Jankovića do poročila. Sklep: »Ni skrivnost, da pri nas resnica, argumenti, dokumenti, številke in dejstva v politiki že dolgo nimajo več domovinske pravice. Politiki vedo, da je obramba z njimi najtežja in najbolj tvegana. Zato je tukaj diskreditacija. Najlažja, najbolj podla in tudi najbolj uspešna.«

Poleg standardne diskvalifikacije o zaroti, politični igri, kazanjem na druge (Janša: »Predsednik KPK, ki je precej mlajši od mene, vozi boljši avtomobil od mene.«), žolčnih nastopih strankarskih vojščakov se je SDS poslužila še pisanja pisem podpore predsedniku. Kar je sicer večinoma naletelo na hudomušne pripombe, da to spominja na pisma, ki jih je prejemal Tito, s čimer se je krepil vtis o priljubljenosti prvega moža SFRJ.

Brez argumentov

Posebna farsa je bilo sejanje obeh svetov strank, kamor sta se obrnila po »zaupnico«. Neki tvitar je to ponazoril s primerjavo, kakor da bi Tito šel po zaupnico v CK ZKJ. V tem duhu so posel bolje izpeljali v PS, kjer so glasovanje odpravili z aplavzom, v SDS pa so izrekli plebiscitarno podporo predsedniku. Nihče pa ni uporabil niti enega argumenta, zakaj poročilo KPK ni verodostojno. Papir, dokaz, številka, ki bi lahko ovrgli poročilo KPK? Ni jih bilo.

Protikorupcijska zakonodaja pa je pristala tudi pri ustavnih sodnikih. Ko je, tudi zaradi ugotovitev KPK, odstopila Katarina Kresal, ko je odšel Pavel Rupar in ko so s papirji KPK glasno mahali poslanci PS ob interpelaciji notranjega ministra Vinka Gorenaka, ne KPK ne zakonodaja niti za hip nista bili sporni. Taki sta postali v trenutku, ko sta bila v igri šefa SDS in PS. Naključje?

Ni sprememb

KPK je konec leta presenetila s kolektivnim odstopom. »Ne odstopamo iz obupa ali občutka nemoči in tudi ne zaradi pritiskov, ker jih znamo prenašati. Odstopamo iz protesta, ker ne moremo več pristajati na to, da se vprašanje korupcije in nasprotje interesov in integritete v tej državi politizira in je predmet populizma,« je dejal Klemenčič. »Odstop smo napovedali že ob predstavitvi poročila o premoženjskem stanju, če se ne bo nič spremenilo. In po našem mnenju se ni nič spremenilo,« je dodal Klemenčič, oblasti in javnosti pa so pustili 15 točk spopada s sistemsko korupcijo. Nihče se jih še ni resno lotil.

Objava poročila je Sloveniji prinesla politično krizo in razpad desnosredinske vlade. Vodenje PS je prevzela Alenka Bratušek, ki je po izglasovani konstruktivni nezaupnici Janševi vladi postala mandatarka, marca pa smo dobili novo vlado. Kronologijo diskreditacije smo sklenili s tvitom uporabnika Gnila Slovenija: »Tudi če bi v KPK sedeli vesoljci, bi apologeti velikih vodij našli način, da se ne pogovarjajo o številkah in dejstvih.«

Nacionalni interes in “nacionalni interes”

Razprodaja državnega premoženja

Kaj je nacionalni interes?

 

Nacionalni interes mora biti vodilo za trajnostni razvoj vsake države. Pri nas je to na slabem glasu, ker so nacionalni interes že ob napovedi zlorabili prevaranti in goljufi. Sedaj nas pa na ta račun oblast zavaja, da je država povsod slab gospodar. Politični mešetarji vidijo rešitev za vse naše težave samo še v razprodaji ter privatizaciji vsega državnega premoženja. In celo naših največjih vrednot..V priprave na nove finančne orgije so pritegnili še nekatere ekonomske in pravne veljake. Oni že vedo, zakaj bo za njih to dobro in tudi donosno.

 

Nacionalni interes je dolgoročni javni interes, ki mora biti nad vsemi sprotnimi in osebnimi interesi! To je na primer ohranjanje naše kulturne identitete, kar je vse od jezika v vrtcu do univerz, od ljudskega izročila do kulturnih in naravnih spomenikov, od ozemlja in morja ter kulturne krajine do ostankov divjine. Javni interes sedanjih in vseh bodočih rodov je, da za trajno ohranimo in varujemo naravo, ki daje obnovljive vire za življenje ljudi in za vse vrste prosto živečih bitij. Gozdovi obnavljajo plodno zemljo, blažijo vremenske skrajnosti, obnavljajo zrak in čistijo vodo od izvirov do potokov in rek, zagotavljajo donose lesa, kar je trajna osnova za lesno industrijo in obrt, za turizem… Zato je varstvo in trajnostna raba vseh gozdov naš nacionalni interes. V gozdu je samo les lastnikov, in še to samo pod pogojem, da strokovno določen posek ne ogroža vseh javnih nalog gozdov. Kdo od lastnikov do ekonomskih in pravnih učenjakov tega še ne ve? Zmeda med javnim in zasebnim v gozdovih je donosna samo za lesne trgovce doma in v tujini. Zakaj oblast nima interesa, da bi to dvoje jasno ločila?

 

Zdravje ljudi je nacionalni in zato tudi javni interes, kar nam govori zdrav razum, še toliko bolj pa to razume vsak bolnik. Zakaj so potem politiki prepletli javno zdravstvo z zasebnim do take mere, da se prelije na škodo zdravja vsako leto na stotine milijonov iz državnega proračuna v zasebne žepe? Zdravstvo je seveda lahko javno in zasebno, vendar mora biti eno od drugega strogo ločeno, tudi od mize in od postelje! Taka zmeda med zasebnim in javnim ni zaradi slabe pameti, pač pa zaradi moči in pohlepa kapitala ter pokvarjenih lobistov pri poslih na vseh ravneh, od toaletnega papirja do operacijskih miz. Samo zaradi prepletanja med javnim in zasebnim je zmeda donosna za izbrance v zdravstvu. Seveda je za izbrance podobno opojna in donosna zmes med javnim in zasebnim tudi v izobraževanju, energetiki, urbanizmu, pri državni infrastrukturi, pri nakupih orožja…

 

Pretoki državnega denarja v zasebne žepe so lahko samo zato, ker za nobeno področje ni sprejetih trdnih in dolgoročnih razvojnih programov. Za politike ter za domače in tuje lobiste je najbolj donosno sprotno barantanje. Še posebno veliko našega javnega denarja bo za vedno izgubljenega ob privatizaciji in pri razprodaji državnega premoženja..Zato skrbno zakrinkani roparji doma in v tujini že čakajo na bogat plen.

Janez Černač

Objavljeno v Financah 17. septembra 2007

Izboljšati državo ali zamenjati ljudstvo?

Gospod Mića Mrkaić kot mantro ponavlja tezo o državni podpori kot vzroku za vse težave tega sveta. Zlo, v katerega prepričuje svoje bralce so poleg države še paraziti umetniki, sindikati in ljudje, delojemalci. Bralec dobi vtis, da je Slovenija nekak preostanek komunističnega etatizma v sicer svobodnem svetu, kjer neomejeno vladajo tržne zakonitosti.

Ta teza je empirična laž. O tem pričajo ZDA, kjer sicer vulgarni ideologi to misel prodajajo kot kavbojski mit, v praksi pa ZDA intervenirajo in podpirajo, če je potrebno tudi hollywoodsko proizvodnjo filma. Le od svoje konkurence zahtevajo, da umakne zaščite. Žal Mrkaič ni izjema, tudi razni LDS-ovi pooblaščenci za kulturo so imeli »državne seske« za poglavitni problem.

Škodljivost tega cenenega populizem ni samo v razširjanju ideološke laži, ampak kot vsaka populistična ideologija tudi ta prikriva prave probleme. Nenehno kazanja s prstom na umetnike, socialno državo, sindikate in na zaposlene kot na nesposobne parazite, onemogoča razpravo o pravem problemu, o kakovosti naše države. Vprašanje, ali je ta država slaba in ali je nujno tako, se sploh ne zastavi.

Če bi država bila tako zlo potem tudi prava ne bi bilo. Potem bi bile idealne države Nigerija, Liberija, Irak takoj po okupaciji in nekoč Srbija. Tu se, vsaj teoretično, Mrkaić strinja s Kardeljem, ki je v teoriji odpravljal državo, kot nekaj a-priori nesprejemljivega.

Državo vodi politika in to bolj ali manj kvalitetno. Empirično ugotovljeno dejstvo je, da je naša država najslabše kar imamo. Medtem, ko se Slovenija po delavnosti, izobrazbi, produktivnosti, varnosti uvršča znatno više, je po kakovost države na 47. mestu. To samo potrjuje ugotovitev tujcev, da je naša primerjalna prednost kakovost, izobraženost, delavnost, podjetnost njenega prebivalstva, gotovo pa ne kakovost države.

Politiki in druge družbene elite so običajno nosilci zaščite javnih interesov. Pri nas ni tako. Dobri pogoji za gospodarjenje sicer niso edini javni interes, kar izhaja iz miselne matrice, kjer je država vedno nekaj slabega, zasebna lastnina pa vedno nekaj odličnega. Tisto kar velja za gospodarstvo velja tudi za druge dejavnosti, denimo za kulturo. Nizka kakovost države se kaže tudi ko država ne uvidi, da kultura postaja pomemben del gospodarstva in da kot izjema na trgu potrebuje poseben režim, zaščito. Četudi jo njeno širše okolje, EU, v to nenehno prepričuje.

V novih demokracijah elite na verjamejo v javni interes. Zato imamo politike, ki temu interesu bolj škodujejo kot ga ščitijo. Temu primerni so potem tudi uradniki, ki bi morali neko določeno politiko izvajati, pa je ne, ali pa jo slabo. Riba pač vedno smrdi pri glavi.

Vzemimo film. Imamo Filmski sklad, ki bi moral omogočati pogoje za kvalitetno produkcijo, distribucijo in razvoj filma in avdio vizualne kulture. Tako je v vseh »starih«, tudi največjih evropskih državah. O nedavna tudi na Hrvaškem. Naša država pa tega ne zna ali/in noče. Raje se ukvarja z državnim producentstvom, to je z vmešavanjem politike v filmske posle, v scenaristiko, produkcijo, celo post produkcijo. Prejšnje vlade so to počenjale pod mizo, diskretno. Zdajšnja gre do konca. Seveda to upravljanje ne more biti drugačno kot nekvalitetno, saj to delajo politični birokrati in samozvani eksperti s posebnimi političnimi pooblastili, skratka klani in ne strokovnjaki. Država namreč za te politike ne predstavlja nujnega instrumenta politike, ampak zlo samo, ki bi ga pravzaprav bilo treba odpraviti. Ker pa se to ne da izvesti do konca, jo je treba kot volilni plen, fevd, zlorabiti in oropati. Država je kot svinja, kjer so politiki urejevalci reda okrog njenih seskov, ki jih ljubosumno čuvajo zase in za svoje kliente.

Nekritični apologeti vsega domnevno ameriškega, ki se ne sramujejo norega redukcionizma in kot edino merilo kakovosti vsega, tudi filma in umetnosti dopuščajo uspeh na blagajni ali »box officu«, pogosto tako pretiravajo, da njihova servilna proameriškost za Ameriko samo ni sprejemljiva. Kar kažejo tudi trenutne ameriške kritike stanja svobode v naših medijih. To dvomljivo proameriškost izvažajo misijonarji, diplomanti ali post diplomanti na ameriških ekonomskih fakultetah. Kot provincialni nepristni »Američani« imajo pač tipična obeležja vseh konvertitov in »poturic«: farsično fanatičnost, prezir lastnega okolja in agresivnost.

Pametni srbski igralec Miki Manojlović pravi, da filma v Evropi ni, ker ga politiki ne rabijo več, obstaja le še v nerazvitih okoljih, kot je Srbija. V Sloveniji, pravi, ga že ni več. Naše nove elite filma niso hotele, paradoksalno, od demokratizacije in osamosvojitve naprej.

Morda, gledališče, opero, slikarstvo, skratka tradicionalne umetnosti še potrebujejo. To so statusni simboli, potrebni vsem parvenijem, kot mesta, kjer se lahko kažejo v svojih novih oblačilih. Film je za plebs, za ljudstvo, za vsakogar, kar je danes prezirano. Berite kaj si o teh ljudeh, o večini ljudi, o neizjemnih ljudeh, o ljudeh, ki zgolj delajo, ki hodijo v službo, o »povprečnežih« dejansko o ljudeh, ki niso dovolj spretni ali brezobzirni, da bi obogateli, misli gospod Mićo Mrkaić.

Nekoč je poslanec Evropskega parlamenta, sarkozijevec, nekdanji minister za kulturo in pravosodje Francije Jacques Toubon dejal, da se motijo tisti, ki pričakujejo, da bo evropska kultura močnejša, ko bodo vzhodne države stopile v Unijo. Obratno bo, je trdil. Tudi Španija in Portugalska, tudien nekdanji diktaturi, sta potrebovali desetletje in več, da sta se naučili evropskih manir in spoznali, da trg ne bo rešil vseh problemov v kulturi.

Edino česar ne razumem je, zakaj mi tako rinemo na Vzhod, saj smo vendar imeli delno tržno, celo delujočo ekonomijo, nismo bili za zaveso, edini smo bili celo nekje vmes. Tudi zemljepisno in kulturno smo bolj na Zahodu kot na Vzhodu. Za to neumnost ni več odgovorna naša geopolitična lega, ampak je zanjo odločilna naša volja. S tem kažemo, kdo dejansko smo.

Res je, da se redukcionistični demagogi niso pojavili šele z vulgarnimi ekonomicisti. Tudi revolucionarni marksizem ni bil nič drugega. Zdaj smo pač v regresivnem obdobju vulgarne kopije razsvetljenstva, le da je »razum« zamenjala »ekonomija«. Vsaj na Divjem Vzhodu, kamor se z našimi »ekonomisti – filozofi« brez dlake na jeziku vred, za vsako ceno želimo priključiti.

 

Igor Koršič

Dobro plačana kolonizacija Slovenije (in EU)

Slovenia: Bank tests treated as military secret

30.12.13 @ 09:18

  1. BY BORUT MEKINA

LJUBLJANA – Bank stress tests indicate that Slovenian lenders do not need a bailout, but private consultancies played a controversial role in the evaluation.

The test results, published last month and accompanied by positive statements from the Slovenian government, the Bank of Slovenia and the European Commission, say Slovenia can recapitalise its banking sector without international help.

But the role of financial consultancies, Oliver Wyman and Roland Berger, and auditors, Deloitte and Ernst & Young, in the exercise has prompted questions on lack of transparency and conflict of interest.

The EU commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) blessed the arrangements.

According to a press statement by the Slovenian central bank, the “scope, conditions and performers of asset quality review and stress-tests were determined by [an] intersector commission after consultation with [the] European Commission and European Central Bank.”

The stress test report on the central bank’s website notes that the tests were “closely monitored by the international organisations, constituted of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the European Banking Authority. These institutions ensured international standards were met and supported the design of the macroeconomic scenarios.”

The bank also says that due to lack of time, the ongoing credit crunch and prolonged negotiations with the EU institutions, it was forced to hire the “suggested” consultancies without a public tender and using a legal procedure normally reserved for arms procurement contracts.

The procedure means that, aside from the results of the tests, all other information, such as the methodology used and the fees paid to the consultancies, have the formal status of military secrets.

Last summer, several Slovenian economists signed a petition demanding that the “credible methodology” – to use the EU commission’s phrase – be made public.

It never was.

Instead, the terms of reference and the whole process underlying the test results was negotiated between the Slovenian central bank and EU officials behind closed doors.

To carry out the tests, some 250 consultants spent four months in Slovenia reviewing eight of its banks.

The personnel, mainly from London, had little knowledge of Slovenian institutions or the Slovenian language.

The exercise was carried out with extensive help from the Slovenian central bank itself, which effectively repeated its own earlier evaluation.

The central bank estimated in October that the cost of the new test will be over €21 million. The initial estimate does not include the consultancies’ possible overtime and additional expenses, which are to be filed later.

By comparison, Spain, whose economy is 40 times larger than Slovenia’s and whose banking sector is 80 times bigger, paid consultancy firms €31 million to do a similar job in 2012.

Pushing down the price

The consultancies had a crucial role in determining how much Slovenian taxpayers will have to pay to put the country’s lenders back onto a stable footing.

Various Slovenian institutions had previously assessed the recapitalisation needs of three Slovenian state banks to be no more than €1.5 billion.

But the new stress tests cited €3 billion.

The figure is higher because the consultancies evaluated some real estate and other assets at their potential liquidation price.

The Slovenian central bank said the new test was “conservative” in its approach.

This is good news for potential investors, but bad news for Slovenia’s taxpayers, who now have to pay twice as much as before to fix the problem.

It could also spell bad news for other EU countries’ tax payers – the Slovenian stress test is likely to act as a template for the ECB’s upcoming review of the eurozone’s 130 top lenders.

The ECB review is also using Oliver Wyman.

For his part, the former Slovenian central bank governor, Mitja Gaspari, has estimated that if the same criteria are used at European level next year, the eurozone recapitalisation price will not be €100 billion, as expected, but approximately six times higher.

Potential conflicts of interest

Meanwhile, the Slovenian consultancy contracts and the private firms’ corporate structure pose questions on potential conflict of interest.

Back in 2012, the consultancy European Resolution Capital Partners (ERC) was hired by the Slovenian finance ministry – again, on the “recommendation” of the EU commission – to help Slovenia set up a bad bank and to perform an asset quality review of the three state banks.

The firm pronounced its verdict on the bank’s assets based on full access to commercially privileged information.

But now, Ovington Capital, an ERC offshoot, is creating an investment fund which will trade the bad bank’s debt.

In other words, ERC first set the price and now it is buying the assets.

Oliver Wyman, the New-York-based firm hired this year for the new test, flagged up its potential conflict of interest in its contract with the Slovenian central bank.

“It is the company’s practice to serve multiple clients within industries, including those with potentially opposing interests. Accordingly, the company may have served, may currently be serving or may in the future serve other clients whose interests may be adverse to those of the client,” the document says.

The company bound itself to “maintaining the confidentiality of each client,” but there is no way for the Slovenian authorities to make sure it does.

Oliver Wyman is part of the Marsh & McLennan group.

According to a 2011 study by the American Institute for Political Studies, the group has 105 companies in 20 different tax-haven countries and paid zero profit tax in the US in 2010.

Other international firms, which co-operated with Oliver Wyman in Slovenia – real estate firms Cushman & Wakefield, Jones Lang LaSalle, Colliers International and CBRE – also have “potentially opposing interests.”

Cushman & Wakefield, for instance, is owned by one of the biggest Italian investment funds, Exor.

Wrong medicine?

The panic about Slovenia becoming the next Cyprus has turned out to be unfounded.

This is shown not just by the new stress test, but also by other reports.

Earlier in December, the Brussels-based think tank Lisbon Council and the oldest German bank, Berenberg, said, in their Euro Plus Monitor report, that Slovenia is the most resilient country in the eurozone when it comes to financial shocks.

“Topping the ranking is Slovenia, a country which had been tipped as the next bailout candidate after Cyprus and still faces one of the highest borrowing costs in the eurozone,” the study says.

It adds: “Slovenia’s public and private debt levels are low, as befits a country with still modest per-capita GDP. Slovenia also runs a sizeable current account surplus and the banking system is small compared to the economy. Its problems seem more than manageable, whether it will need eurozone support or not.”

By many other standards, Slovenia is not really the healthiest euro-country.

International analysts and the EU commission usually say that state-owned companies and state ownership more broadly caused the country’s economic problems.

But the real reason is the government’s wrong-headed economic policies.

In the economic boom years of 2004 to 2007, when Slovenia joined the eurozone, the country was flooded by cheap euro money.

The government was not prepared for it.

It did not respond with countermeasures, such as saving schemes, to cool the economy.

Instead, new money was borrowed, taxes were cut, big projects were started and banks rolled out credit to investors.

Private sector and state debt rose from €15 billion to €33 billion in just four years. Ironically, state banks were, in that period, the most cautious. Their loan-to-credit ratio was at that time 1:1.3, while foreign banks in Slovenia, like Hypo, Raifeissen or Unicredit had a ratio of between 1:2 and 1:2.5.

Despite this, the EU commission in its macro-economic recommendations this year insisted that Slovenia privatises its banking sector.

The Slovenian government has also promised to sell 15 other state-owned companies, ranging from telecoms to energy and the Ljubljana airport.

The money will be used to lower the country’s state debt, which has now risen from 50 percent of GDP to some 75 percent of GDP.

Its debt climbed, in large part, due to the Oliver Wyman-dictated €3 billion bank recapitalisation.

The Slovenian state has no other option but to sell off assets.

But if the timeframe is short and the assets seized from banks are sold at liquidation price, the bill for Slovenian taxpayers will be even higher than it had to be.

At the same time, investors – such as firms in the Marsh & McLennan group “whose interests may be adverse to those of the client [Slovenia]” – will get an opportunity to snap up Slovenia’s crown jewels at bargain rates.

Borut Mekina is a journalist writing for the Slovenian weekly Mladina

Ideološke papige?

 

Delo, 28. 12. 2013.

Intervju s še enim sociologom:

“A zlasti na levici je pogostnost nastajanja novih strank precej velika. Kako gledate na to?

Med tistimi organiziranimi vstajniki, ki so razmišljali o strankarskem nastopu, so bila pred slabim letom dni tri vsebinska jedra: liberalno-socialdemokratsko, radikalno levičarsko in meščansko- kulturniško.

Iz prvega je nastala stranka Solidarnost, iz drugega pa Iniciativa za demokratični socializem, ki bo verjetno tudi nastopila na volitvah.

Teoretično imajo oboji precej odprte možnosti, uspeh pa bo odvisen od tega, ali bodo ponudili izvedljiv program, ali jim bo uspelo prepričati ljudi, ki tonejo v apatijo, in ali jih bodo pripravljeni tudi poslušati in razumeti. Odločilno bo, ali bodo sestopili iz intelektualnih oblakov in se zmogli približati navadnim ljudem, takšnim, kakršni so.”

Verjetno je že nastopil čas, ko je globokoumnih razlagalcev, raznih predalčkarjev, forumov, simpozijev in zbornikov več, kot je  primerkov vrste, ki jo razlagajo. Razumem novinarje, da gredo k svojim kolegom sociologom, saj kdo pa bo to razlagal, če ne družboslovci!  (Tudi nuklearko razlagajo nuklearni fiziki, mar ne!) Razumem tudi naslovljene eksperte, ki, ko enkrat že vprašani, morajo nekaj povedati, drugače nam sporočajo, da pač njihove stroke ali pa oni sami niso kaj prida.

Potlej ne preseneča, da eksperti povedo več o trendih in obvezni literaturi, s katero jih zalagajo njihovi “revolucionarni” profesorji ter o trenutno prevladujočih idologijah na njihovih oddelkih in katedrah kot o samem raziskovalnem predmetu.  Človek bi si želel, da bi, namesto da sprašujejo drug drugega o nečem, za kar se zdi, da je nek pojav na Marsu, o katerem ne moremo pridobiti jasnih podatkov, da bi ti ljudje, novinarji, sociologi, psihologi, filozofi … povprašali primerke proučevanja same, o tem kje se vidijo, kam po njihovo sodijo, ali imajo meščansko kulturniške ali proletarsko radikalne ali pak socialdemokratsko liberalne vrednote, politične cilje, porekla, miselne in siceršnje navade? In vprašali bi jih lahko, čemu le služujo te vstaje? In ali so vstaje sploh še opravilno sposobne? In če ne, čemu po njihovem mnenju niso?  Morda se je pa skotila v nederjih te zakotne in filisterske  province  kaka nova politična vrsta, morda celo izvirna politična misel, prebilsk, opazka, kak nov pojem, nalepkica? Saj so pojmi,  ki jih omenjajo, končno nekako zgodovinsko in ideološko, da ne rečem predpotopno strankarsko ideološko pogojeni.  Če bi jih namesto ponavljanja ideoloških kategorij s smetišča zgodovine zanimali pojavi sami,  bi lahko razvili tudi malo strastnega raziskovalnega duha namesto zdolgočasenega ponavljanja do onemoglosti prežvečenga. Potem bi kot botaniki, ki najdejo kako novo rastlino, laho celo spisati novo etiketo, odprli nov vzorčni lonček, epruveto ali predalček  in se lotili opisa dotlej še ne videnih primerkov. Ampak teh strasti jih ne učijo in  posledično jih take skušnjave ne dajejo. Zato vse primerke zmečejo v svoje tri zaprašene in starikave ideološke lončke.